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I.

INTRODUCTION

In August of 2007 the California Supreme Court took a second affirmative
step towards nullifying the efficacy of class arbitration waivers.2 In Gentry v.
Superior Court, the California Supreme Court sought to further clarify their then

1

Michael B. Cooper is a J.D. candidate at Pepperdine University School of Law.
See generally Gentry v. Superior Court (Gentry), 42 Cal. 4th 443 (2007). As will be discussed in
depth throughout this Note, the Gentry court follows closely on the heels of Discover Bank v. Superior
Court which limited the validity of class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts. See generally
Discover Bank v. Superior Court (Discover Bank 2), 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005).
2
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two year old ruling in Discover Bank v. Superior Court.3 The two primary issues
in Gentry were the validity of a class arbitration waiver within an employment
setting and whether the entire arbitration agreement was void for
unconscionability.4 The majority concluded that, in some instances, such a class
arbitration waiver may be invalid and that any presence of procedural
unconscionability warranted judicial scrutiny of the agreement in full.5
The California Court of Appeal had rejected Gentry’s petition for mandate
based on the validity of the arbitration agreement he had signed when hired by his
former employer, Circuit City Stores, Inc.6 The California Supreme Court
reversed that ruling and remanded with instructions to thoroughly analyze the
arbitration agreement for substantive unconscionability.7 Moreover, the majority
found that the class arbitration waiver in a wage and hour employment claim may
be invalid since it would be a de facto waiver of an unwaivable statutory right.8
This decision expands the holding of Discover Bank 2, which addressed
consumer contracts, to the realm of employment contracts.9 As such, the position
of the majority places class arbitration waivers in employment agreements in peril;
specifically, the use of a class arbitration waiver may not only be an invalid clause
within the agreement, but could potentially void the entirety of the employment
contract.10 The widespread use of alternative dispute resolution measures in
employment contracts, many with a class arbitration waiver, creates the potential
that Gentry will have a widespread effect throughout Corporate America.11 The

3
Id. at 452. The California Supreme Court made it quite clear that Gentry’s petition for rehearing
was granted so that the court could “clarify our holding in Discover Bank.” Id.
4
See generally id. at 453, 466-67.
5
Id. at 450. The court held that “at least in some cases, the prohibition of classwide relief would
undermine the vindication of the employees’ unwaivable statutory rights and would pose a serious
obstacle to the enforcement of the state’s overtime laws.” Id.
6
Gentry v. Superior Court (Gentry Appeal), 135 Cal. App. 4th 944, 946-47 (Ct. App. 2006). The
record in the California Court of Appeal reflects the deference the Second Appellate District showed for
the arbitration agreement under the California Arbitration Act. Id. at 948.
7
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 472-73. Upon remand, the California Court of Appeal again denied
Gentry’s claim stating that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable, nor did the holding of
Discover Bank 2 apply to the present claim. See Gentry Appeal, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 948.
8
Id. at 450.
9
See generally Discover Bank 2, 36 Cal. 4th 148. In the future a court which finds the arbitration
clause invalid, due to unconscionability or an invalid waiver of a statutory right, may be cause to void
the entire agreement if sufficiently offensive to the Gentry holding. See generally Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at
443.
10
See generally J. Maria Glover, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735 (2006) (discussing the growing use of
mandatory arbitration provisions and clauses that prohibit class actions in employment contracts
thereby raising the specter of corporate abuse); Jonathan Rizzardi, Recent Development: Discover Bank
v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1093 (2006) (discussing the impact of
Discover Bank 2 and its ramifications for mandatory arbitration provisions within consumer and
employment contracts in the future); Julia B. Strickland & Stephen J. Newman, Shock Waives, 29 L.A.
LAW., Mar. 2006, at 22 (discussing the authors’ role as lead counsel on behalf of Discover Bank 2 and
their view of the widespread impact Discover Bank 2 will have in California corporate law).
11
See Strickland & Newman, supra note 10, at 22. Strickland and Newman contend that the
California Supreme Court’s decision in Discover Bank 2 impinges the “freedom of contract . . . in the
context of private agreements for dispute resolution.” Id. The inference may be drawn that the wide
breadth of Discover Bank 2 will likewise be seen in the wake of Gentry. Gentry specifically addressed
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ambiguity in the majority’s decision sets the stage for a series of subsequent
decisions where the court will have to ascertain when exactly a class arbitration
waiver “undermine[s] the vindication of the employees’ unwaivable statutory
rights.”12
Gentry’s impact presents three interesting questions for California trial
courts, California employers, and California employees. First, how should a trial
court determine “in some cases” that the class arbitration waiver seeks to waive a
statutory right and should be struck down?13 Second, as Gentry is implemented
throughout the state, are employers and employees to assume that wage and hour
issues are not subject to arbitration, or just not subject to class arbitration? Third,
has the California Supreme Court created an administrative monster for the trial
courts by placing certain employment disputes outside of the arbitral forum and
solely within the judicial system?
This case note will provide a detailed evaluation and prediction of the
landscape remaining in a post-Gentry California and the cases to follow in that
vein. Part II will present a brief overview of arbitration agreements, class
arbitration waivers and relevant statutes within the California Labor Code.14 In
Part III, the essential facts behind Gentry will be set forth as a means to illustrate
the basis from which the California Supreme Court reached their recent
conclusion.15 Part IV examines the opinions of both the Court’s majority and
dissenting Justices.16 Part V will attempt to synthesize what ramifications Gentry
may have in California on employment contracts, public policymaking and the
state judicial system.17 Finally, Part VI concludes this case note.18
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Arbitration Agreements
Over the course of the second half of the twentieth century, “Corporate
America” began to explore avenues of dispute resolution outside of the established
court systems.19 Among the developments has been an increased preference for

the unwaivable statutory right to a minimum wage and overtime pay for California employees. See
generally Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 443.
12
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 450.
13
Id.
14
See infra Part II.
15
See infra Part III.
16
See infra Part IV.
17
See infra Part V.
18
See infra Part VI.
19
See generally David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, The Appropriate Resolution of Corporate
Disputes: A Report on the Growing Use of ADR by U.S. Corporations (Cornell/ PERC Inst. on Conflict
Resol., Ithaca, N.Y.), Jan. 1998. In a survey of more than half of the Fortune 1000 corporations, the
study found that the use of alternative dispute resolution was employed by nearly every corporation that
completed the survey. Id. at 8. Specifically, the survey found that 87% of the Fortune 1000 had
utilized mediation as a means to avoid a dispute leading to litigation. Id. at 9. The use of arbitration
amongst these corporations was 80% within the previous three years. Id. Interestingly, the survey also
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the use of an arbitrator to officiate disputes.20 Corporate America has moved
steadily towards the use of arbitrators in a number of situations; among the most
prevalent have been consumer-related disputes and employment-related disputes.21
What was once predominantly the province of labor unions and corporations has
now spread to the average American consumer and employee.22
In 1925, the United States Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”), which set forth a “strong federal policy [in favor] of enforcing arbitration
agreements, including agreements to arbitrate statutory rights.”23 The FAA was a
means by which the Federal government sought to rebut the predominant feeling
among the Federal judiciary that an arbitral forum was inadequate when compared
to the courts.24 Two years after the United States Congress acted, the California
Legislature followed suit and passed the first comprehensive arbitration legislation
in California.25 The current arbitration statute, the California Arbitration Act
(“CAA”), was adopted in 1961 and has since remained in full effect.26
California courts have been consistent in their approach towards the
enforcement of arbitration in the abstract.27 The use of arbitration agreements

concluded that the use of alternative dispute measures was favored by an overwhelming majority of inhouse counsel, with over 80% preferring mediation or arbitration to litigation. Id.
20
Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 19, at 9. The Cornell/ PERC Institute on Conflict Resolution
survey gauged the pulse of the corporate in-house counsel for more than half of the Fortune 1000
corporations and found that the trend towards alternative dispute methods was growing. Id. at 29-30.
Corporations surveyed forecasted that the increase in the use of mediation and arbitration would
continue to grow; more than 80% foresaw using mediation and nearly 70% anticipated using the arbitral
process to avoid expensive litigation. Id.
21
Id. The survey specifically found that the corporations were most likely to employ the use of
mediation or arbitration in employment settings. Id. at 11. Nearly 80% of those surveyed used
mediation for employment disputes and the use of arbitration was found in 62% of employment
disputes. Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 19, at 11.
22
See generally James J. Alfini, Sharon B. Press, Jean R. Sternlight & Joseph B. Stulberg,
MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE (2nd ed. 2006). The authors present a historical perspective of the
growth and domain of alternative dispute resolution in the opening chapter. Id. It is noted that the
original intent behind the alternative dispute legislation was “the goal of sustaining industrial stability”
to “private sector union and management personnel engaged in collective bargaining.” Id. at 1. It is
worth noting that the employment realm has seen “the most explosive growth in the use of” alternative
dispute resolution procedures since the late 1960’s. Id. at 10
23
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc. (Armendariz), 24 Cal. 4th 83, 96-97 (2000).
24
See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1984) (describing the Congressional
intent behind the Federal Arbitration Act as a declaration of a national policy favoring arbitration and
providing for the enforcement of such provisions).
25
Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 97. The California legislature adopted the first state-wide arbitration
act in 1927 which declared arbitration agreements to be irrevocable and enforceable “in terms identical
to those used in section 2 of the federal act.” Id. Moreover, “since that time California courts and its
Legislature have ‘consistently reflected a friendly policy toward the arbitration process.’” Id.
26
Id. The California Supreme Court made clear that the arbitration policy in California was
further expanded and clarified in 1961 and remains the effective policy of the state. Id. at 98.
Additionally, of particular importance to the discussion presented in this Note, is that the California
Arbitration Act, “unlike the FAA, contains no exemption for employment contracts.” Armendariz, 24
Cal. 4th at 98.
27
See id. (holding that arbitration agreements should be enforced pursuant to the Federal
Arbitration Act and the California Arbitration Act provided they do not violate established contract
principles allowing for avoidance of a contract); Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 1064 (2003)
(holding that California will remain true to the premise of the Federal Arbitration Act and enforce valid
arbitration agreements).
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between parties has been upheld in a variety of instances by the California
Supreme Court.28 However, while the courts are willing to uphold the validity of
such agreements to arbitrate, that is not to say that the courts have given parties
complete freedom to enter into arbitration agreements.29 Instead, California courts
have applied the common law defenses to contracts as a means by which to ensure
that arbitration agreements are not invalid or illegal.30
In 2000, the California Supreme Court handed down a decision in
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Pyschcare Services, Inc., which has become a
seminal case in California arbitration law.31 In Armendariz, the California
Supreme Court took up the issue of whether mandatory employment arbitration
agreements could be upheld in light of prevailing statutory rights.32 The court held
that “such claims are in fact arbitrable if the arbitration permits an employee to
vindicate his or her statutory rights.”33 Moreover, “the arbitration must meet
certain minimum requirements, including neutrality of the arbitrator, the provision
of adequate discovery, a written decision that will permit a limited form of judicial
review, and limitations on the cost of arbitration.”34 Upon setting forth the
minimum requirements for arbitration to constitute a valid dispute resolution
forum, the court went on to explore the possibility that an otherwise valid
arbitration agreement may be void based on the common law doctrine of
unconscionability.35
28
See generally Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 83; Discover Bank 2, 36 Cal. 4th at 148; Little, 29 Cal.
4th at 1064.
29
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (stating
that some statutory claims may not be appropriate for arbitration; however, “if Congress intended the
substantive protection afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a
judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history.”). Id.
30
See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2007) (the statutory language states that written provisions to settle disputes by
arbitration are enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”).
31
See, e.g., Murphy v. Check ‘N Go of Cal., Inc., 156 Cal. App. 4th 138, 145 (Ct. App. 2007)
(raising Armendariz as the standard for analyzing whether an arbitration agreement should be deemed
unconscionable or not), and Little, 29 Cal. 4th at 1064 (using the accepted Armendariz analysis to
ascertain whether the arbitration agreement in question met the substantive and procedural requirements
necessary for enforcement).
32
Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 90. The Armendariz court set forth a series of minimum
requirements which courts should use to analyze whether or not an agreement to arbitrate is valid and
enforceable. Id. Specifically, the court highlighted the “neutrality of the arbitrator, the provision of
adequate discovery, a written decision that will permit a limited form of judicial review, and limitations
on the costs of arbitration.” Id.
33
Id. (emphasis added). The discussion surrounding the ability to arbitrate statutory rights has
been robust in recent years. “The core concern . . . is whether there is a sufficiently close nexus
between the class action waiver and non-waivable substantive rights such that these waivers should not
be left to private bargaining.” Glover, supra note 10, at 1760.
34
Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 91.
35
Id. at 113.
Unconscionability analysis begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is
one of adhesion. ‘The term contract of adhesion signifies a standardized
contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength,
relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or
reject it.’ If the contract is adhesive, the court must then determine whether
‘other factors are present, which, under established legal rules—legislative or
judicial—operate to render it unenforceable.’

464

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. II:2

Armendariz declared that “under both federal and California law, arbitration
agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”36 “Unconscionability
is one such ground.”37 Unconscionability has two primary components: procedural
unconscionability and substantive unconscionability, which must both be present
in order for the court to find that an agreement is unconscionable.38 The doctrine
is generally met where there exists an “absence of meaningful choice on the part of
one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonabl[y] favorable
to the other party.”39
Unconscionability is most often found in so-called “contracts of adhesion.”40
A contract is deemed adhesive if a “standardized contract, which, imposed and
drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing
party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.”41 If a contract is
Id.
36
Szetela v. Discover Bank (Discover Bank 1), 97 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1099 (Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that “an agreement to arbitrate is enforceable unless a recognized contract defense, such as
unconscionability, exists.”). Id. The Discover Bank 1 court set forth the essential elements of contract
unconscionability: procedural and substantive. Id. at 1100-01. Procedural unconscionability “focuses
on the manner in which the disputed clause is presented to the party in the weaker bargaining position.”
Id. Substantive unconscionability “addresses the fairness of the term in dispute.” Id.
37
Id. Unconscionability, as a common law contract defense, has been a defense to agreements to
arbitrate adopted by the California Supreme Court. See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 113.
However, recent decisions by the California Supreme Court have led the court to find that there is a
sliding scale between procedural and substantive unconscionability; therefore, the mere presence of one
element may be sufficient to establish a complete defense to the contract if there is an abundance of the
other element. Discover Bank 1, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 1100. “The more substantively oppressive the
contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion
that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” Id.
38
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 211 Cal. App. 3d 758, 767
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989). The Dean Witter Reynolds court thoroughly examined the various methods courts
use to analyze whether unconscionability is present. Id. at 767-68. Procedural unconscionability is
often identified by the presence of oppression, or “no real negotiation and the absence of meaningful
choice.” Id. at 767. The second factor found in procedural unconscionability is hallmarked by surprise;
the surprise occurs when “the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in a prolix
printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the disputed terms.” Id. On the other hand,
substantive unconscionability is found where the contract “is overly harsh or one-sided and is not
justified by the circumstances in which the contract was made.” Id. at 768. The overarching principle
was reiterated by the Dean Witter Reynolds court, quoting the A & M Produce Co. court, that both
elements must be present “before a contract will be held unenforceable” and “a relatively larger degree
of one will compensate for a relatively smaller degree of the other.” Id. (quoting A & M Produce Co. v.
FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)).
39
Id.
40
See Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 1064, 1071 (2003) (standing for the principle that
the “procedural element of an unconscionable contract generally takes the form of a contract of
adhesion…”). Id. The Little court quoted heavily from the Armendariz decision in ascertaining
whether a contract was one of adhesion or not. A contract of adhesion is generally “imposed and
drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegat[ing] to the subscribing party only the
opportunity to adhere to the contract of reject it.” Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 113.
41
Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 113. The Armendariz court sought to provide a clear explanation of
what exactly constitutes a contract of adhesion. As such, quoting from Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., a
contract of adhesion can also be characterized as one which does not result from a freedom of
bargaining and equality of bargaining. Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1961). Moreover, “most contracts which govern our daily lives are of a standardized
character. We travel under standard terms, by rail, ship, airplane, or tramway. We make contracts for
life or accident assurances under standardized conditions. We rent houses or rooms under similarly
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found to be adhesive, that does not invalidate its contents; rather, an element of
adhesion is “the beginning and not the end of the analysis insofar as enforceability
of its terms is concerned.”42 Therefore, a contract of adhesion may be “fully
enforceable according to its terms unless certain other factors are present which,
under established legal rules . . . operate to render it otherwise.”43
If a court determines that a contract is one of adhesion, the next inquiry will
entail whether unconscionability is also present in sufficient measure to allow the
court to refuse to enforce the agreement.44 That is, even if a contract is adhesive, it
is not unconscionable and may still be enforced; adhesion simply raises a red flag
for the court to examine unconscionability.
As mentioned above,
unconscionability is composed of a procedural and substantive element; the
“former includes (1) ‘oppression’ . . . and (2) ‘surprise’” while the latter consists of
“an allocation of risks or costs which is overly harsh or one-sided and is not
justified by the circumstances in which the contract was made.”45 While both
procedural and substantive unconscionability must be evidenced to invalidate an
agreement, “a relatively larger degree of one will compensate for a relatively small
degree of the other.”46
controlled terms; authors or broadcasters, whether dealing with public or private institutions, sign
standard agreements; government departments regulate the conditions of purchases by standard
conditions." Id. (quoting Friedmann, Law and Social Change in Contemporary Britain, p. 45).
42
Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 819 (1981) (quoting Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp.,
63 Cal.App.3d 345, 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)). The Scissor-Tail court relied on a series of California
cases which have held that the use of a contract of adhesion may still be valid and enforceable. Id. See
generally Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Meyers v. Guarantee
Sav. & Loan Assn., 79 Cal. App. 3d 307 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Yeng Sue Chow v. Levi Strauss & Co.,
49 Cal. App. 3d 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); and Schmidt v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d
735 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
43
Graham, 28 Cal. 3d at 819-20. The recognized legal rules which may result in the avoidance of
a contract of adhesion are legislative and judicial rules. Id. Among the legislative rules which may
provide for a defense to a contract of adhesion are statutory provisions stipulating that certain
provisions will make the contract unenforceable. Id. at 820. There are two judicially recognized
limitations to the enforcement of contracts of adhesion: first, if the “provision does not fall within the
reasonable expectations of the weaker or ‘adhering’ party [it] will not be enforced against him”; and
second, a “provision, even if consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties, will be denied
enforcement if, considered in its context, it is unduly oppressive or ‘unconscionable.’” Id.
44
Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114. The California Civil Code provides that “a court can refuse to
enforce an unconscionable provision in a contract.” Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5). The
statute states that “if the court as a matter of law finds the contract or clause of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce
the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.” Id.
45
Dean Witter Reynolds, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 767-68. A tangential element noted by the California
Court of Appeal in this decision was that of the buyer’s sophistication as it relates to whether a contract
will be found unconscionable. Id. The courts made a distinction between sophisticated and
unsophisticated buyers and the role that sophistication will play in the courts decision. In the former
situation, the courts are less apt to find sophisticated buyers subject to unconscionable contracts; while
in the latter case, the courts seek to protect unsophisticated buyers from remaining subject to an
unconscionable contract. See Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 927 (1985). Interestingly,
the Gentry court drew no such parallel to employment contracts and the sophistication of the employee.
46
Dean Witter Reynolds, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 768. The Dean Witter Reynolds court was faced with
a situation whereby an attorney opened a retirement account with the defendant Dean Witter Reynolds.
Id. at 761. The court found that the fees charged by the defendant when the attorney closed out his
account presented “some measure of substantive unconscionability” since the “challenged fees maybe
‘too high.’” Id. at 768. The court’s analysis focused on whether there was indeed oppression or
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B. Class Action Waivers: Discover Bank 2
Prior to the decision in Gentry, the California Supreme Court had taken up
the issue of class action waivers in consumer contracts in Discover Bank v.
Superior Court (“Discover Bank 2”).47 While arbitration agreements have been
upheld and enforced by California courts, subject to the minimum requirements set
forth above, the issue of a class action waiver in mandatory arbitration agreements
had not been adjudicated prior to the Discover Bank 2 decision.48 This case hinged
on: first, whether the arbitration agreement was valid; and second, whether the
provision for class action waiver was also valid.49 While most jurisdictions have
upheld the use of such waivers in similar agreements, the California Supreme
Court met the provision with greater skepticism in Discover Bank 2.50
The Discover Bank 2 court held that “under some circumstances class action
waivers would not be enforceable under California law.”51 A class action waiver
may be unconscionable “when the waiver is found in a consumer contract of
adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably
involve small amounts of damages. . . .”52 The court did “not hold that all class
action waivers are necessarily unconscionable.”53 Instead, where a waiver
“becomes in practice the exemption of the party ‘from responsibility for [its] own
surprise which would show procedural unconscionability. Id. The court held that “any claim of
‘oppression’ may be defeated if the complaining party had reasonably available alternative sources of
supply.” Id. In this instance though, the available alternatives that the attorney had to choose from
when opening a retirement account negated any claim that the practice by defendant was oppressive,
and thus, not unconscionable. Id. at 772.
47
See generally Discover Bank v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005)
(Discover Bank 2).
48
See Julia B. Strickland & Stephen J. Newman, Shock Waives, 29 L.A. LAW. 22 (Mar. 2006).
Strickland and Newman state that “California courts have long struggled with the inherent tension
between a general policy of favoring freedom of contract and a desire to scrutinize contractual choices
individual parties make.” Id. at 22. The Discover Bank 2 court was an initial attempt to scrutinize the
use of class action waivers in the consumer contract setting. Id. at 25.
49
See Discover Bank 2, 36 Cal. 4th at 149.
50
See Julia B. Strickland & Stephen J. Newman, Shock Waives, 29 L.A. LAW. 22, 24 (Mar. 2006).
There has been a nationwide trend to litigate the issue of class arbitration waivers. Id. “Most
jurisdictions that have ruled on the issue enforce class actions waivers. In contrast, recent decisions in
California reflect greater skepticism toward these provisions.” Id. The decisions in these cases have
placed California “at odds with the general trend nationwide. The majority of jurisdictions that have
ruled on this issue allow enforcement of class action waiver provisions pursuant to ordinary freedomof-contract principles. Id. at 25.
51
Id. The Discover Bank 2 court held, in full, that “at least under some circumstances, the law in
California is that class action waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion are unenforceable, whether the
consumer is being asked to waive the right to class action litigation or the right to class wide
arbitration.” Discover Bank 2, 36 Cal. 4th at 153.
52
Discover Bank 2, 36 Cal. 4th at 162. The Discover Bank 2 court reasoned that the predictably
small amounts of damages are sufficiently persuasive to disavow the use of a class arbitration waiver in
a consumer contract. Justice Moreno stated that the class arbitration waiver is void as unconscionable
where “it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money.” Id.
Moreover, it was argued that to uphold the class arbitration waiver would be to in effect exempt the
“party ‘from responsibility for its own fraud, or willful injury to person or property of another.’” Id. at
163. In the previously described scenario, a class arbitration waiver would be “unconscionable under
California law and should not be enforced.” Id.
53
Id.
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fraud or willful injury to the person or property of another’” the waiver is
“unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced.”54
The aforementioned California law, California Civil Code § 1668, states that
“all contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone
from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of
another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of
the law.”55 Therefore, if the class action waiver were to indirectly exempt
Discover Bank from their alleged fraudulent charging of late fees, the waiver
would be deemed in violation of public policy and thereby unconscionable and
invalid.56 The court carefully stated that the class action’s validity was not
dependent on whether the waiver was within an arbitration agreement or not.57
Since the waiver’s lawfulness is not dependent on whether it is a part of an
arbitration agreement, the “arbitration clause did not immunize the class action
waiver from review pursuant to ordinary unconscionability analysis.”58
C. California Labor Code
The crux of Gentry’s initial class action suit was the violation by Circuit City

54
Id. at 163. The language employed by the Discover Bank 2 court is nearly identical to the
statutory language of the California Civil Code governing contracts. The language is also reminiscent
of the statutory language of the Federal Arbitration Act which states that written provisions to settle
disputes by arbitration are enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.” See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2007).
55
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (Deering 2007). One California Court of Appeal decision summed up
the statute’s intent as follows: “despite its broad language, section 1668 does not apply to every
contract.” Cregg v. Ministor Ventures, 148 Cal. App. 3d 1107, 1111 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). Instead,
section 1668 will “only be applied to contracts that involve ‘the public interest.’” Id. The Cregg court
did acknowledge that “the concept of a contract involving the public interest is surely difficult to
define.” Id.
56
See Discover Bank 2, 36 Cal. 4th at 161. The court was careful to clarify that “class action and
arbitration waivers are not, in the abstract, exculpatory clauses. But because . . . damages in consumer
cases are often small and because ‘a company which wrongfully exacts a dollar from each of millions of
customers will reap a handsome profit’, ‘the class action is often the only effective way to halt and
redress such exploitation.” Id. Therefore, the effect of the class action and arbitration waivers in the
consumer contracts in question were exculpatory in nature since no individual would bring a suit in this
instance as it was a negative value suit.
57
See generally id. at 165. The conclusion reached in this decision is not specific to the use of
class arbitration waivers in arbitration agreements. Rather, the principles set forth in Discover Bank 2
are more broadly applicable to all contracts. “It applies equally to class action litigation waivers in
contracts without arbitration agreements as it does to class arbitration waivers in contracts with such
agreements.” Id. at 165-66.
58
Julia B. Strickland & Stephen J. Newman, Shock Waives, 29 L.A. LAW. 22, 25 (Mar. 2006). The
distinction drawn by the Discover Bank 2 court is important as it broadens the scope of California
courts’ “traditional protection of consumer interests.” Id. Among the concerns addressed by the court
were: “doubt that individual small claims court litigation, administrative proceedings, or informal
resolution could serve as ‘adequate substitutes’ for class action proceedings seeking to redress claims of
intentional wrongdoings to large numbers of people, causing predictably small amounts of damage.”
Id. The decision places California in the minority of jurisdictions which have held that class arbitration
waivers are not enforceable. Id. Among the other jurisdictions disallowing the use of class arbitration
waivers are Missouri, Ohio, West Virginia and Florida.
See generally Whitney v. Alltel
Communications, 173 S.W. 3d 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E. 2d
1161 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); West Virginia ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E. 2d 264 (W. Va. 2002);
Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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Stores, Inc. of the California Labor Code.59 Specifically, Gentry contended that
Circuit City’s practices were violative of California Labor Code sections§§ 510
and, 1194 which stipulate how many hours in a workday and overtime
compensation respectively.60 The importance of these two statutes, as will be
discussed below in the analysis of Gentry61, is whether or not they should be
deemed unwaivable statutory rights in the context of arbitration agreements
containing class action waivers.62
The United States Supreme Court has held that “statutory claims may be the
subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA.”63 However,
“by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than judicial, forum.”64 Therefore, the court should consider statutory
claims appropriately arbitrable unless “Congress itself has evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.”65

59
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 450. Gentry brought the lawsuit pursuant to California Labor Code §§
510 and 1194 which he alleged had been impinged by his employer, Circuit City Stores, Inc. Id. at 455.
Gentry claimed a misclassification of his employment status as an exempt employee, when in fact he
believed that the job description and duties of his position were akin to that of a non-exempt employee.
Id. at 451.
60
See generally CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 510, 1194 (Deering 2007). Section 510 states that
“nonexempt employees will be paid one and one-half their wages for hours worked in excess of eight
per day and 40 per week and twice their wages for work in excess of 12 hours a day or eight hours on
the seventh day of work.” Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 455. Section 1194 seeks to enforce the provisions of
section 510 by providing a private right of action to employees who allege their statutory rights have
been violated; the statute provides that “notwithstanding any agreement to work for a lesser wage, any
employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to
the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this
minimum wage or overtime compensation.” Id.
61
See infra, Part III.
62
See Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 175 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding
that under federal law, “[r]equiring employees prospectively to waive their statutory rights to sue in
order to obtain or maintain their employment is utterly inconsistent”).
63
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). Among the various statutory
rights the United States Supreme Court has upheld in the past thirty years include suits arising under the
Sherman Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act and the Securities Act of 1933. Id. See generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
64
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi, 743 U.S. at 628). This distinction is particularly
important in the language of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Gilmer. The arbitration
agreement was upheld as valid under the circumstances and the waiver of a statutory right was found to
be proper. See generally id. Moreover, the ability to freely contract and negotiate is a vital component
of corporate practice and should not be unnecessarily impinged without Congress’ intervention. Id. at
25. This reasoning seems to have driven the Gilmer court’s decision to uphold the agreement to
arbitrate where the arbitral forum adequately allowed for protection of the petitioner’s statutory rights
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Id. At this point the court also made clear
their support of the Federal Arbitration Act. The evident belief that arbitration will provide an adequate
forum for the resolution of a statutory right goes to the heart of the Federal Arbitration Act’s
endorsement of a national policy favoring arbitration. Id.; see generally 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2007).
65
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 260. The reasoning behind this endorsement of the arbitral forum is
twofold. First, the Federal Arbitration Act evinces a strong policy in favor of arbitration. Id. at 25.
Second, by submitting to arbitration of a statutory right the two parties are trading “the procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628. The key distinction in both Gilmer and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. was the
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Specifically, the Supreme Court noted that the legislature may evince its intention
through: the text of the legislation, the legislative history, or an “inherent conflict
between arbitration and [the legislation’s] underlying purpose.”66
Additionally, the particular California Labor Code provisions at issue, if
sufficiently synonymous with similar federal labor laws, may be unwaivable
statutory rights.67 The Federal Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) was considered by
the United States Supreme Court to be of a “nonwaivable nature of an individual
employee’s right to a minimum wage and to overtime pay under the Act.” 68 The
Supreme Court reasoned that the “statutory enforcement scheme . . . permits an
aggrieved employee to bring his statutory wage and hour claim ‘in any Federal or
State court.’”69 The failure of Congress to include any procedural barriers led the
court to believe that the rights were sufficiently important as to be considered
“nonwaivable.”70
California Labor Code § 1194 explicitly states that “notwithstanding any
agreement to work for a lesser wage, any employee receiving less than the legal
minimum wage . . . is entitled to recover.”71 The “rights to the legal minimum
wage and legal overtime compensation conferred by the statute are unwaivable.”72
The code establishes “a clear public policy . . . that is specifically directed at the
enforcement of California’s minimum wage and overtime laws for the benefit of
workers.”73
assurance that the arbitral forum was an adequate forum by which to resolve statutory disputes.
66
Id. The United States Supreme Court has had a number of occasions to evaluate whether
Congress evinced an intention to disallow the arbitral forum for resolution of a statutory dispute. See
generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985); Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220 (1987).
67
See generally Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1981)
(stating the principle that the United States Supreme Court has held in the past that there are certain
provisions within the Fair Labor Standards Act which may not be waived by contract). See also
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945); D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108
(1946).
68
Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 740. Therefore, as a nonwaivable statutory right, an employee cannot
abridge this right by contract nor may they otherwise waive the rights because “this would ‘nullify the
purposes’ of the statute and thwart the legislative policies it was designed to effectuate.” Id. (quoting
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil ,324 U.S. 697 (1945)).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 741. The Barrentine court held that “[a]ny custom or contract falling short of that basic
policy, like an agreement to pay less than the minimum wage requirements, cannot be utilized to
deprive employees of their statutory rights.” Id. Therefore, if the California Labor Code sections
Gentry alleged had been violated are sufficiently synonymous with their federal counterpart, then the
California Supreme Court may deem them to be nonwaivable statutory rights in much the same way.
This Note assumes the proposition that the analogous nature of the California Labor Code to the Federal
Fair Labor Standards Act warrants the same level of protection and classification as a nonwaivable
statutory right.
71
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1194 (Deering 2007).
72
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 455. See also Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 4th
319, 340 (Cal. 2004) (holding that California Labor Code section 1194 confirms a “clear public policy .
. . that is specifically directed at the enforcement of California’s minimum wage and overtime laws for
the benefit of workers”). Id. Moreover, “California’s overtime laws are remedial and are to be
construed so as to promote employee protection . . . [and] this state has a public policy which
encourages the use of class action device.” Id.
73
Earley v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 79 Cal. App. 4th 1420, 1429-30 (Cal. Ct. App.
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III. FACTS
A. Factual Background
Robert Gentry was hired as an employee of Circuit City Stores, Inc. in
1995.74 As a part of the orientation process, Gentry was given a packet of
information; among the items included in this packet were an “Associate Issue
Resolution Package” and Circuit City’s “Dispute Resolution Rules and
Procedures.”75 These two pamphlets contained the relevant information regarding
the dispute resolution procedures particular to Circuit City.76 Circuit City
employees were given a number of dispute resolution options, including
arbitration, in the event of an employment-related conflict.77
In the event that Gentry opted for the arbitration process, he would have to
agree to “dismiss any civil action brought by him in contravention of the terms of
the parties’ agreement.”78 This provision also contained a class action arbitration
waiver stating that “[t]he Arbitrator shall not consolidate claims of different
Associates into one proceeding, nor shall the Arbitrator have the power to hear
arbitration as a class action.”79 Additionally, the arbitration clause placed
constraints on damages, awarding of attorney’s fees and restricted the statute of
limitations for employment-related actions.80 Circuit City employees were
permitted to opt out of both the dispute resolution and arbitration agreement
programs if done within thirty days.81 Robert Gentry did not avail himself of the
opportunity to opt out of the Circuit City “Dispute Resolution Rules and
Procedures.”82
Gentry brought suit against Circuit City Stores, Inc. on August 29, 2002
alleging that he had been subject to violations of the California Labor Code by
Circuit City.83 Gentry sought to file his action as a class action lawsuit in
California Superior Court on behalf of salaried customer service managers.84
2000). It is interesting to note at this point, that the California Court of Appeal has adopted a twofold
approach to the statutory wage issue. First, “[s]traight-time wages (above the minimum wage) are a
matter of private contract between the employer and the employee. Entitlement to overtime
compensation, on the other hand, is mandated by statute and is based on an important public policy.”
Id. at 1430. “The duty to pay overtime wages is a duty imposed by the state; it is not a matter left to the
private discretion of the employer.” Id. (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 1173 (Deering 2007)). The courts
have placed great emphasis on the belief that “wage and hours laws ‘concern not only the health and
welfare of the workers themselves, but also the public health and general welfare.’” Earley, 79 Cal.
App. 4th at 1430.
74
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 451.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 451.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
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Particularly, Gentry alleged that Circuit City had “illegally misclassified as exempt
managerial/executive employees not entitled to overtime pay, when in fact, they
were non-exempt non-managerial employees entitled to be compensated for hours
worked in excess of eight hours per day and [forty]40 hours per week.”85
B. Procedural Posture
In August of 2002, when Gentry initially filed his class action lawsuit, there
was a split in California as to the enforceability of these types of class action
waivers in contracts – specifically consumer contracts.86 Circuit City made a
motion to compel arbitration in the sSuperior cCourt.87 The court, in light of
conflicting case law, chose to follow the California Court of Appeal’s decision in
Discover Bank v. Superior Court and found two of the provisions “substantively
unconscionable.”88 Upon severance of the unconscionable provisions, the Superior
Court ordered Gentry to “arbitrate his claims on an individual basis and submit to
the class action waiver.”89
Gentry subsequently filed a mandate petition with the California Court of
Appeal on September 9, 2003.90 The petition was denied by the Court of Appeal
since the issue was pending before the California Supreme Court.91 The California
Supreme Court granted Gentry’s petition for review and withheld hearing the
merits until the decision in the pending Discover Bank v. Superior Court action
was decided.92 Upon reaching a conclusion in the Discover Bank action, the
California Supreme Court remanded Gentry’s case for reconsideration.93
The California Court of Appeal denied Gentry’s petition for a second time on
remand from the California Supreme Court.94 The grounds for denial were a lack
of unconscionability and the dissimilarity between Discover Bank and Gentry’s
claims.95 It was determined that the thirty day opt-out provision meant that the

85

Id.
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 451. The split in California case law at the time was between the
decisions reached in Discover Bank 1 and Discover Bank 2. Discover Bank 1 held that class action
waivers were unconscionable in a consumer contract. See generally Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal.
App. 4th 1094 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). In Discover Bank 2, the California Court of Appeal had held that
the use of class arbitration waivers must be upheld under the Federal Arbitration Act and the California
Arbitration Act. See generally Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. App. 4th 326 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003). However, on appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal in Discover
Bank 2, thereby declaring that in some instances a class arbitration waiver was unconscionable and
therefore invalid. See generally Discover Bank v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 36 Cal. 4th
148 (Cal. 2005).
87
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 452.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id..
93
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 452.
94
Id.
95
Id.
86
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arbitration clause was not unconscionable since it was not an “adhesive element.”96
Additionally, the Court of Appeal found that the claims in Gentry’s suit were
distinguishable from Discover Bank since they would not involve “predictably . . .
small amounts of damages.”97
The California Supreme Court granted review of Gentry’s claim in order to clarify
their previous holding in Discover Bank.98
IV. OPINION ANALYSIS
A. Majority Opinion – Moreno, J.
At the outset, Justice Moreno’s majority opinion establishes that the decision
is not going to be one which will provide lower courts a bright line test for future
cases of this nature. The essential holding of the case is that “at least in some
cases, the prohibition of class wide relief would undermine the vindication of the
employees’ unwaivable statutory rights.”99 Justice Moreno continues on that
waivers of this nature “should not be enforced if a trial court determines . . . that
class arbitration would be . . . significantly more effective . . . than individual
arbitration.”100 Therefore, because of the possibility of instances where a class
arbitration waiver would undermine unwaivable rights, the California Supreme
Court remands this case for reconsideration.101
The second issue presented by this case is whether “a provision in an
arbitration agreement that an employee can opt out . . . means that the agreement is
not procedurally unconscionable, thereby insulating it from employee claims
that . . . [it] is substantively unconscionable.”102 Here the majority sets forth an

96

Id.
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 452.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 450. (emphasis added). The ambiguous nature of this holding, that some class arbitration
waivers will be invalid and some will be upheld by the courts, creates confusion and does little to guide
lower courts or employers as to how they should proceed in the future. See generally Rizzardi, supra
note 10 at 1093 (stating that the impact of Discover Bank 2 will be an increased uncertainty in
consumer contracts as to what may or may not be deemed unconscionable by the courts post-Discover
Bank 2).
100
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 450. Justice Moreno essentially sets forth as a driving premise of the
decision a belief that class arbitration waivers should not be upheld where class arbitration would be the
most effective measure to resolve a particular dispute. However, merely echoing the benefits of class
action litigation or arbitration is insufficient to guide trial courts in their analysis. As has been noted by
many courts,
[I]t is firmly established that the benefits of [class] certification are not measured
by reference to individual recoveries alone. Not only do class actions offer
consumers a means of recovery for modest individual damages, but such actions
often produce “several salutary by-products, including . . . avoidance to the
judicial process of the burden of multiple litigation involving identical claims.”
Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., 23 Cal. 4th 429, 445 (2000) (quoting Vasquez v. Superior Court of San
Joaquin County, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 808 (1971)).
101
See generally Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 450.
102
Id. at 450-51. It should be noted that Justice Moreno clearly sets forth an important premise
undermining Circuit City’s defense in this case. Justice Moreno notes that a “finding of procedural
97
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essential premise regarding procedural unconscionability; while it is not required
to invalidate a class arbitration waiver, it is “a prerequisite to determining that the
arbitration agreement as a whole is unconscionable.”103 This tenet is important
since it establishes that procedural unconscionability must be present in order for
the court to analyze whether there is in fact substantive unconscionability.
Moreover, the majority states that contrary to the findings by the California Court
of Appeal, there is an element of procedural unconscionability present; as such, on
remand the court should determine “whether provisions of the arbitration
agreement were substantively unconscionable.”104
The initial discussion presented in the majority opinion centers on whether
class arbitration waivers in overtime cases are contrary to public policy or not. As
this case was heard following the Discover Bank 2 decision, the majority
undertakes a comprehensive synthesis of the facts and holdings presented
therein.105 The majority carefully and calculatedly sets forth the prime tenets of
Discover Bank 2 as they relate not only to consumer class arbitration waivers, but
class arbitration waivers in more general terms.106 Specifically, the majority
highlights that “one-sided, exculpatory contracts in a contract of adhesion, at least
to the extent they operate to insulate a party from liability that otherwise would be
imposed under California law, are generally unconscionable.”107 The important
distinction between Discover Bank 2 and Gentry, according to the majority, is that

unconscionability is not required to invalidate a class arbitration waiver if that waiver implicates
unwaivable statutory rights.” Id. at 451. The essential reasoning here, akin to the United States
Supreme Court holding in Barrentine, is that to avoid a contract involving a non-waivable statutory
right one need only plead the right’s unwaivable nature and not a common law contract defense. See
generally Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 740.
103
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 450-51. The Gentry decision adopts much of the previous case law
definition for unconscionability and does little to expand or clarify the meaning of unconscionability in
the employment contract context. The two-step analysis for unconscionability, consisting of procedural
and substantive unconscionability, is much the same as the language found in previous California
Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 113; accord Little, 29 Cal. 4th at 1071 .
104
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 451. It is interesting that the majority goes so far as to specify the
existence and presence of procedural unconscionability based on the employment setting, but fails to
undergo any further analysis to ascertain whether substantive unconscionability also exists. The end
result of such incomplete analysis is to create a more confusing task for the lower court. On remand,
the court must assess whether or not there is indeed unconscionability present in the employment
contract and accompanying agreement to arbitrate. Additionally, if the court has found the California
Labor Code sections at issue to be non-waivable then the presence, or lack thereof, of unconscionability
is irrelevant as the statutory rights cannot be waived. See id.
105
Id. at 453-55. The court goes quite far a field from the question at hand in their attempt to
clarify what the holding of Discover Bank 2 was meant to say. The Discover Bank 2 holding expressed
the preference in California for the protection of consumer interests, perhaps to the detriment of the
freedom to contract. See Strickland & Newman, supra note 10 at 25.
106
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 453-55. The majority reiterates that they believe that “at least some class
action waivers in consumer contracts are unconscionable” and that their holding in Discover Bank 2
was not intended to limit that to consumer contracts. Id. at 453. However, this is seemingly at odds
with the rhetoric employed by the majority in Discover Bank 2 (a decision also penned by Justice
Moreno). In Discover Bank 2 it was held that “when the [class action] waiver is found in a consumer
contract of adhesion . . . such waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not be
enforced.” Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 162-63. The previous holding would seem to indicate its
limited application to consumer contracts, a position Justice Moreno backs away from in the Gentry
decision.
107
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 454.
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here the issue presented is an attempt to waive a plaintiff’s statutory right under the
California Labor Code to minimum wage and overtime pay – an issue the court did
not take up in Discover Bank 2.108
Unlike Discover Bank 2, Gentry has brought a claim stemming from
California Labor Code statutes.109 The majority analyzes the California Labor
Code and reads the textual commitment that an employee is entitled to bring a civil
action “[n]otwithstanding any agreement” as meaning the right is unwaivable.110
The majority raises three primary rationales to support their belief that this right is
unwaivable: first, the “public policy fostering society’s interest in a stable job
market;” second, “the Legislature’s decision to criminalize certain employer
conduct;” and third, the “public policy goal of protecting employees in a relatively
weak bargaining position against ‘the ‘evil of overwork.’”111
The majority undertakes a review of the Armendariz requirements for
arbitration of an unwaivable statutory right as applied to Gentry’s situation.112 The
issue is further focused as the majority frames the issue to be “whether a class
arbitration waiver would lead to a de facto waiver of statutory rights . . . .”113 The
108
Id. at 455. While the court did not expressly take up the issue of waiver of statutory rights in
Discover Bank 2, it did take a broad approach to the question posed. The plaintiff in Discover Bank 2
sought to avoid enforcement of a class arbitration waiver he claimed to be unconscionable, partly on
public policy grounds. See generally Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 4th 886, 893-94
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005). There it was left undecided whether “California has a fundamental public policy
against class action waivers, finding the issue ‘unnecessary’ to its analysis.” Strickland & Newman,
supra note 10 at 26.
109
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 455. Gentry’s claim stems from the violation of the aforementioned
California Labor Code provisions covering statutory rights to minimum wage, overtime, and the
maintenance of a private action against one’s employer to recover damages in violation of said
provisions. Id.
110
Id. This interpretation of the statutory language is particularly interesting given the analysis
employed by the United States Supreme Court in Gilmer. In that decision, Justice White writing for the
majority held that the legislative intent to evidence the non-waivable nature of a statutory right will be
found in the statute or accompanying legislative history. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. Justice White
plainly stated that the protection of the statutory right should be explicit within the statute or legislative
history. Id. In Gentry, however, the majority takes a liberal approach to the meaning of
“[n]otwithstanding any agreement” as a bridge to conclude that the right is meant to be nonwaivable.
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 455.
111
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 456. The three premises set forth by the majority to conclude that the
statutory rights are not waivable should be compared with the justifications advanced by the United
States Supreme Court in Barrentine in which Justice Brennan pointed to exact language in the
legislative history as to the nonwaivable nature of the statutory right at hand. See Barrentine, 450 U.S.
at 739. Where the Barrentine court had specific language in the legislative history to substantiate their
holding, the Gentry majority cites vague public policy arguments which have no basis in the legislative
history.
112
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 456. The Armendariz court set forth a series of procedural safeguards to
ensure that where a statutory right is being arbitrated, that right is protected to the same extent as it
would have been in a judicial forum. See generally Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 83. The requirements
stated in Armendariz are: provision for neutral arbitrators; provisions for more than minimal discovery;
requirements of a written award; provisions for all of the types of relief that would otherwise be
available in court; and, the arbitration process does not require employees to “pay either unreasonable
costs or any arbitrators’ fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum.” Id. at 102.
113
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 457. The issue as framed is an important distinction between the
Discovery Bank 2 and Gentry decisions. The Discover Bank 2 court did not have the opportunity, nor
did they voluntarily take up the issue of statutory rights in the arbitral forum. See generally Discover
Bank 2, 36 Cal. 4th 148. As the Gentry court framed the issue it brought an entire segment of
arbitration case law, namely Armendariz, into play that was not discussed at length in the Discover
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majority concludes that “under some circumstances such a provision would lead to
a de facto waiver and would impermissibly interfere with employees’ ability to
vindicate unwaivable rights . . . .”114
Here again, the majority is forced to further clarify their holding in Discover
Bank 2 as it pertains to class arbitration waivers. Circuit City relies on the premise
set forth in Discover Bank 2 that miniscule amounts make the likelihood of
individual claims unlikely in consumer actions.115 The majority counters that the
holding in Discover Bank 2 was not intended to limit the instances of
unenforceable class arbitration waivers to miniscule monetary damages claims;
rather, a more general principle was set forth that where a class arbitration waiver
acts as an exculpatory clause it should not be enforced.116
The majority bolsters their argument using the reasoning presented by
Gentry as to the analogous nature employment claims may have to consumer
claims. First, Gentry has presented a wage and hour claim, which will often seek
modest damages.117 The majority relies on the Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County premise which legitimizes class actions as
necessary tools in certain instances of litigation.118 Class actions allow
Bank 2 decision. The implications that Armendariz and unconscionability have on the Gentry decision
are profound and will be discussed in the analysis below.
114
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 457. Justice Moreno, before coming to any conclusion, does make note
of the central holding in Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. whereby submission to an arbitral forum does not
waive a party’s statutory rights. Id. The Little court made it clear that “a party compelled to arbitrate
such rights does not waive them, but merely ‘submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum . . . .’” Little, 29 Cal. 4th at 1079. The distinction the Gentry court is implicitly making
here is that while Little approved of the use of arbitration for statutory rights, those were of a waivable
nature; here, however, the statutory rights being submitted to arbitration are not waivable and therefore
Little’s holding should not apply.
115
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 457 Circuit City, relying on Discover Bank 2’s reasoning, argued before
the California Supreme Court that the invalid class arbitration waivers should only be those in which
the claim of damages is a predictably small amount of damages. Id. The Discover Bank 2 court was
faced with a consumer class arbitration waiver in which the defendant, Discover Bank, had charged the
plaintiff a twenty-nine dollar penalty. Discover Bank 2, 36 Cal. 4th at 154. While attempting to certify
a class action against Discover Bank, the plaintiff alleged that the number of cardholders affected by
Discover Bank’s breach of contract could be millions of consumers. Id. The Gentry court, on the other
hand, was faced with an employment scenario whereby it was conceivable that some of the claims of
damage would be substantial and thereby would warrant individual litigation or arbitration. Gentry, 42
Cal. 4th at 457.
116
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 457. The majority points out that the average claim in California for a
wage and hour adjudication, from the years 2000-05, was $6,038. Id. at 458 (quoting ASIAN PACIFIC
AMERICAN LEGAL CTR. ET AL., REINFORCING THE SEEMS: GUARANTEEING THE PROMISE OF
CALIFORNIA’S LANDMARK ANTI-SWEATSHOP LAW, AN EVALUATION OF ASSEMBLY BILL 633 SIX
YEARS LATER 2 (2005)) A second statistic, compiled by the Asian Pacific American Legal Center,
stated that the “average claim for overtime and minimum wage violations submitted to [Department of
Labor Standards Enforcement] ranged from $5,000 - $7,000 and settlement ranged from $400 $1,600.” Id. While the amounts involved are certainly more significant than the $29 at issue in
Discover Bank 2, they are also quite insignificant when compared to the actual costs of present day
litigation. Interestingly, Justice Moreno noted that the Bell court had found that a claim for $37,000
would not even be “ample incentive” for an individual lawsuit for overtime pay. Id. at 458.
117
Id. at 457-58. The record in the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court
does not make mention of the amount of damages Gentry has claimed.
118
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 459. Justice Moreno succinctly and effectively quells Circuit City’s
argument in favor of the efficiency of arbitration in his adoption of the Sav-On Drug Stores holding.
The majority points out that “the requirement that numerous employees suffering from the same illegal
practice each separately prove the employer’s wrongdoing is an inefficiency that may substantially
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“employees who are subject to the same unlawful practices a relatively
inexpensive way to resolve their disputes” and eliminates potentially repetitious
litigation while providing “small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for
claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation.”119
Second, the majority considers that employees may be hesitant to bring
individual actions for fear that their employer may retaliate in response to the
litigation.120 The majority then notes that a California statute prohibits retaliation
in response to litigation by employees.121 However, the statute is disregarded as
the majority draws the conclusion that the anti-retaliation statute is insufficient to
relieve the “fear of retaliation” which may “deter employees from individually
suing their employers.”122
Third, the possibility that an employee may not know that his/her rights have
been violated provides an additional justification for the majority to find class
arbitration waivers potentially invalid.123
Justice Moreno sets forth a
compassionate and detailed list of possible scenarios by which an employee may
be ignorant of, or unable to pursue redress for, legal rights infringed by their
employer.124 The majority reaches the conclusion that for the foregoing
drive up the costs of arbitration and diminish the prospect that the overtime laws will be enforced.” Id.
The Sav-On court majority noted that for common claims, akin to the claim presented in Gentry,
“absent class treatment, each individual plaintiff would present in separate, duplicative proceedings the
same or essentially the same arguments and evidence . . . .” Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc., 34 Cal. 4th at
340. This duplicative process would “be neither efficient nor fair to anyone, including defendants . . . .”
Id.
119
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 459. Akin to Sav-On Drug Stores, the Gentry court reasons that the class
action, whether in litigation or arbitration, will provide the parties and the forums with an expedited and
efficient means to resolve disputes. The Sav-On Drug Stores opinion extols the virtues of class actions
“by establishing a technique whereby the claims of many individuals can be resolved at the same time. .
. eliminat[ing] the possibility of repetitious litigation and provid[ing] small claimants with a method of
obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation.” SavOn Drug Stures, Inc., 34 Cal. 4th at 340.
120
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 459-60. The conundrum faced by many employees in the situation
analogous to Gentry’s is an unpleasant one at best. The CH2M Hill court summarized this scenario best
when they framed it as two unappealing choices. See Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 798,
820-21 (2001). The first choice is to resign and bring legal action shortly after the initial signs that their
rights had been violated. Id. The second choice is to “persist in the informal accommodation process
and risk forfeiture of the right to bring such an action altogether.” Id at 821. The CH2M Hill, Inc. court
did make mention of a third option, albeit the worst case scenario, whereby the employee retains their
employment “while bringing formal legal action against the employer.” Id.
121
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 460. The relevant statute is California Labor Code section 98.6 which
states, in pertinent part,
no person shall discharge an employee or in any manner discriminate against any
employee or applicant for employment because . . . the employee or applicant for
employment has filed a bona fide complaint or claim or instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceeding under or relating to his or her rights . . . .
CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.6 (Deering 2007).
122
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th. at 461. The Gentry court takes a pragmatic approach towards the antiretaliation statute in this instance. Justice Moreno wrote that since the “retaliation would cause
immediate disruption of the employee’s life and economic injury” and the dispute resolution process
yields an uncertain outcome, the mere existence of an anti-retaliation statute does not adequately protect
the employee. Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 461-62. A Federal District Court in New York, in a class action certification claim, set
forth a poignant assessment of the need for class actions in an employment setting. See generally
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possibilities, without “effective enforcement, the employer’s cost of paying
occasional judgments . . . may be significantly outweighed by the cost savings of
not paying overtime.”125
After consideration of Gentry’s arguments, the majority adopts an approach which
orders a trial to court consider the aforementioned factors and concludes that if:
[a ] class arbitration is likely to be a significantly more effective practical
means of vindicating the rights of the affected employees than individual litigation
or arbitration, and finds that the disallowance of the class action will likely lead to
a less comprehensive enforcement of overtime laws for the employees alleged to
be affected by the employer’s violations, it must invalidate the class arbitration
waiver to ensure that these employees can ‘vindicate [their] unwaivable rights in
an arbitration forum.’126
The majority reinforces their holding by citing the failure of the California
Legislature to overturn or modify any of the elements set forth in Armendariz.127
The minimum requirements set forth in Armendariz are employed as an initial
means for trial courts to ascertain whether the arbitral forum will adequately
protect the statutory rights of an employees claim in similar situations.128
The majority quickly dispenses with Circuit City’s argument that the
administrative process ensured by the statute would adequately protect employees’

Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81 (S.D. N.Y. 2001). Individual employees, of a
certain class of employment, may be unwilling to file their own individual suits. Id. at 85-86. “Their
lack of adequate financial resources or access to lawyers, their fear of reprisals (especially in relation to
the immigrant status of many), the transient nature of their work, and other similar factors suggest that
individual suits as an alternative to class action are not practical.” Id. The impractical element is
significant, as the appropriate standard in class action litigation is whether or not bringing individual
suits is “impractical,” not “impossible.” See Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 936 (2d Cir. 1993).
125
Gentry, Cal. 4th at 462. In addition to Justice Moreno’s economic analysis of the costs of
litigation versus the costs of doing business for many corporations it is important to note that there is a
second economic analysis which factors into many employment wage and hour cases. Many employees
may be unwilling to bring their claims in either the arbitral or judicial forum individually because the
suit is a so-called “negative value claim.” See Glover, supra note 10 at 1737. “A negative value suit is
one in which the total costs of pursuing the claim exceed the total expected recovery for that claim.” Id.
at 1737, n.3. The resulting effect of a negative value claim is that an individual is less likely to pursue
that claim for fear that the litigation or arbitration costs, coupled with any possible ramifications, will
offset any award down the road. “Unless you can aggregate your claims with those of others, you may
have no effective recourse to vindicate your claims.” Id. at 1737.
126
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 463. It is at this point in the analysis where Justice Moreno seems to lead
lower courts into a quagmire of uncertainty. For instance, he writes that “not all overtime cases will
necessarily lend themselves to class actions, nor will employees invariably request such class actions.”
Id at 462. However, previously he had extolled the analogous nature of wage and hour claims to
consumer claims (such as the one presented in Discover Bank 2) by pointing out that they were both for
relatively small amounts. Id. at 458. Secondly, after stating the benefits of a class action in an
employment wage and hour setting Moreno closes with the thought that not “in every case will class
action or arbitration be demonstrably superior to individual actions.” Id. at 462. As will be discussed
below, this failure to set forth a clear standard for lower courts will likely lead to a second series of
litigated cases whereby the California Supreme Court must clarify not only Discover Bank 2 but now
also Gentry.
127
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 464, n.7. The majority notes that the California Arbitration Act has been
amended by the Legislature three times since the decision in Armendariz. Id. Justice Moreno holds
these amended versions up as proof that the Legislature has not intended to allow statutory rights to be
waived through contract. Id.
128
See generally id. at 464.
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statutory rights.129 The majority does not believe that its holding runs afoul of the
FAA either.130 Instead, Justice Moreno relies on their finding that class action
waivers are to be analyzed in the same manner, regardless of whether contained in
an arbitration agreement or not.131 The majority contradicts the dissent’s belief
that legislative indicators point towards the arbitration of employee-related wage
and hour disputes.132 Instead, the majority sets forth an assertion that over the past
70 years the legislative intent in California has been to ensure that employees have
“direct access to a judicial forum to enforce their rights.”133
The second half of this opinion addresses whether or not there is
unconscionability present in the class arbitration waiver and agreement sufficient
to declare the entire agreement invalid.134 Justice Moreno notes that the California
Court of Appeal found that the thirty day opt-out provision was indicative of no
finding of procedural unconscionability.135 However, contrary to the lower court,
129

Id.
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 465. The majority draws a subtle distinction here which bears
mentioning. The Federal Arbitration Act, as its name implies, covers only “written provision[s] . . .
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration...” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2007). Justice
Moreno contends that since the holding set forth in Gentry will apply to arbitration agreements and nonarbitration agreements alike it is outside the province of the Federal Arbitration Act. Gentry, 42 Cal.
4th at 465. This premise was also posited by Justice Moreno in his Discover Bank 2 decision whereby
he debated and dismissed Discover Bank’s argument that the Federal Arbitration Act should prompt the
court to enforce the class arbitration waiver. See Discover Bank 2, 36 Cal. 4th at 163-73. This runs
contrary to the United States Supreme Court line of cases stemming from Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
which have come to define the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act. See generally Mitsubishi Motors
Corp., 473 U.S. at 614.
131
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 465. Justice Moreno’s rationale behind this assertion is seemingly the
same reasoning set forth in Discover Bank 2. There, Justice Moreno held that the Federal Arbitration
Act does not preempt an unconscionability defense to the enforcement of class action waivers under
California state law. Discover Bank 2, 36 Cal. 4th at 165. The majority says that since whether a class
action waiver is lawful does not depend on whether it is part of an arbitration clause, the arbitration
clause did not immunize the class action waiver from review pursuant to ordinary unconscionability
analysis. Id. Pointing to the statutory language, Justice Moreno draws a distinction between a “statelaw principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue” and
“section 2 of the FAA and a state law that ‘governs issues concerning the validity, revocability, and
enforceability of contracts generally.’” Id.
132
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 465 n. 8. “Proponents may also argue that the lack of a pronouncement
by the California Legislature of a general policy prohibiting enforcement of class action waivers
demonstrates a lack of fundamental public policy.” Strickland & Newman, supra note 10 at 26.
Strickland and Newman’s proposition, albeit in reference to Discover Bank 2, is just as applicable to
Justice Moreno’s contention in Gentry that legislative silence is equivalent to acquiescence.
133
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 465 n. 8. The majority further interprets the legislative intent as
evidencing a refusal to enforce “provisions of arbitration agreements that significantly undermine the
ability of employees to vindicate their statutory right to overtime pay.” Id. Additionally, the majority
finds comfort in the Federal Arbitration Act and California Arbitration Act which both “permit
arbitration-neutral rules that limit specific provisions of arbitration agreements on public policy
grounds.” Id.
134
Id. at 466. The California Court of Appeal did not find the presence of any procedural
unconscionability and therefore stopped their analysis at this point. See generally Gentry v. Superior
Court, 135 Cal. App. 4th 944 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). The Court of Appeal relied on the presence of a
thirty day opt-out provision which they determined to be, much like the Ninth Circuit in previous cases,
sufficient to avoid unconscionability challenges. Id. at 949-50.
135
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 465. In addition to the Court of Appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
Circuit City arbitration agreements on two previous occasions in 2002. See generally Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2002);Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198
(9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit found that the thirty day opt-out provision meant that the contract
130
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the majority holds that since the statutory rights are not waivable the arbitration
agreement must meet the strict standards set forth in Armendariz.136
Justice Moreno acknowledges that statutory rights, which are not waivable,
may be arbitrated; however, the employer and employee may only arbitrate such
rights “after a dispute has arisen.”137 The distinction in this case, and one the
majority finds convincing, is that this agreement to arbitrate was entered into prior
to the dispute.138 As such, the court must “ensure that the arbitration forum . . . is
sufficient to vindicate his or her rights.”139 The majority proceeds to undertake an
Armendariz analysis of the agreement to ascertain whether in fact the entire
agreement should be struck down based on Gentry’s assertion of
unconscionability.140
First, Gentry’s counsel argued that the agreement was ineffective because he
could not have assented to the agreement by his silence.141 However, the majority
briefly addresses the straight-forward and easily comprehensible nature of the
agreement and dismisses Gentry’s contention.142 In fact, the majority explicitly

was not one of adhesion; therefore the threshold element of procedural unconscionability had not been
met making the substantive unconscionability analysis unnecessary. See Ahmed, 283 F.3d at 1200.
136
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 467. Herein lies the essential distinction made by the Gentry court in
relation to the previous line of arbitration agreement case law. The Gentry case distinguishes the nonwaivable nature of certain statutory rights with the ability of employers and employees to freely
contract.
137
Id. The majority in this instance seeks to further parse the case between pre and post dispute
agreements to arbitrate. This further dissection of the arbitral opportunities for employees and
employers makes it all the more likely that these statutory disputes will be further confined to the
judicial forum, as opposed to the arbitral forum. The inability to contract pre-dispute, as stated in
Armendariz, effectively removes all employee wage and hour claims from the arbitral forum since no
employer is going to announce ahead of time their intent to cheat employee out of deserved wages. See
generally Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 103, n.8; and Glover, supra note 10 at 1747-48.
138
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 468-69.
138
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 468-69.
139
Id. at 467. However, as previously noted, this assurance that the arbitral forum is sufficient to
vindicate a statutory right is a tautological argument since the pre-dispute arbitration agreement shall
not be enforced according to Gentry and Armendariz. See generally id.; Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 103,
n.8. If the pre-dispute agreement will not be enforced, why should the courts entertain the time and
effort to analyze the sufficiency of the arbitral forum to achieve the protection of statutory rights?
140
See generally Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 467-68. Unconscionability is one recognized defense in
California courts for the avoidance of a contract, a provision the Federal Arbitration Act recognizes as a
defense to arbitration agreements. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2007); accord Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Superior Court of Alameda County, 211 Cal. App. 3d 758, 767-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). See supra
notes 31-35 and accompanying text for an overview of the Armendariz analysis.
141
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 468. The majority quickly and efficiently takes up Gentry’s argument
regarding acceptance by silence and summarily dismisses the notion. Quoting competing arguments
from Corbin on Contracts, the majority first notes that “an offeror has no power to cause the silence of
the offeree to operate as an acceptance”; however, it is then noted that Corbin also stated that silence
can constitute acceptance when “;the conduct of the party denying a contract has been such as to lead
the other reasonably to believe that silence . . . would be sufficient’ to create a contract.” Id. (quoting
Corbin on Contracts (rev. ed. 1993) §§ 3.19, 3.21, p. 407, 414)
142
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 468. The agreement to arbitrate reads as follows:
I understand that participation in the Issue Resolution Program is voluntary. If I
do not wish to participate in the arbitration component of the Program, however,
I must send the completed ‘Circuit City Arbitration Opt-Out Form,’ which is
included in this package. I must send the Opt-Out Form via U.S. mail . . . within
30 calendar days of the date on which I signed below. I understand that if I do
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finds that Gentry “manifested his intent to use his silence . . . as a means of
accepting the arbitration agreement.”143 Therefore, the question is not whether
Gentry validly assented to the agreement; instead, the court must evaluate whether
there was sufficient evidence of unconscionability in the agreement to invalidate
it.144
Justice Moreno sets forth the various definitions and standards surrounding
the legal concept of unconscionability in the arbitration context.145 While the
California Court of Appeal did not find there to be any procedural
unconscionability, the majority notes that a complete Armendariz analysis entails
assessing whether there are both procedural and substantive unconscionability.146
While there is a continuum of incidental to severe unconscionability, if the court
concludes that there is “no element of procedural unconscionability . . . a court will
not disturb the contract.”147
In reversing the Court of Appeal, the majority states that the agreement does
indeed contain elements of procedural unconscionability; however, the majority
fails to specifically identify what those elements may be.148 The mere presence of

not . . . I will be required to arbitrate all employment-related legal disputes I may
have with Circuit City.
Id. It is clear from the language in the arbitration agreement, and the majority reasoned accordingly,
that this was not legalese or complicated language; instead, the form was quite specific and clear as to
what steps Gentry must take to avoid the arbitration component of the program.
143
Id. According to Corbin, quoted at note 139 supra, the reasonable expectation of Circuit City in
this instance was that Gentry’s silence (or failure to opt out) constituted an acceptance. Id. Moreover,
the court reemphasizes that the arbitration agreement “was neither inconspicuous or difficult to
understand.” Id.
144
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 468-69. Justice Moreno accurately assesses the true essence in Circuit
City’s argument: there is a valid contract that Gentry assented to by his silence. However, the argument
set forth by Gentry, perhaps not eloquently stated, is that even if there is a valid contract, the contract
should be set aside based on its unconscionable elements. Id.; see supra note 38 and accompanying
text.
145
Id. at 571-73. The essential elements of unconscionability are: the presence of both procedural
and substantive unconscionability which results in an overly harsh or one-sided result. See generally
Armendariz, 24 Cal 4th at 113-14; and Discover Bank 2, 36 Cal. 4th at 160-61.
146
Id. One resulting impact that Gentry is sure to have on California courts is a more thorough
undertaking of the unconscionability analysis originally set forth in Armendariz. The majority’s
emphasis on ensuring that the lower court not conclude their analysis prematurely if they find no
procedural unconscionability seems to indicate that courts will turn more of their attention to the
unconscionability analysis than they may have previously. However it may also indicate, as will be
discussed below, that the courts will be able to conjure elements of unconscionability where before they
did not.
147
Id. at 470. The majority again backs down from their own heavy handed rhetoric by
acknowledging that if a lower court were to find zero presence of procedural unconscionability then
there can be no unconscionability. Id. The court itself says that “if we take the Court of Appeal . . . at
its word that there was no element of procedural unconscionability in the arbitration agreement . . . then
the logical conclusion is that a court would have no basis . . . to scrutinize or overturn even the most
unfair or exculpatory of contractual terms.” Id. This sentiment seems to stand in apposite from the
analysis Moreno undertakes whereby he takes the Court of Appeal to task for prematurely concluding
their unconscionability analysis by stating there was no procedural unconscionability. See generally id.
at 468-69.
148
Id. Here again, it would seem, much as in Discover Bank 2, the majority goes quite far a field
to make a finding of unconscionability such as to warrant invalidating the arbitration agreement. In
Discover Bank 2, the focus was on the method of presentation and the acceptance by conduct employed
by Discover Bank in implementing the arbitration agreements. See Discover Bank 2, 36 Cal. 4th at
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procedural unconscionability necessitates that a court investigate whether there is
also substantive unconscionability.149 Since the Court of Appeal failed to find
procedural unconscionability, their analysis ended; on remand, the Court of Appeal
will have to indulge in a thorough analysis to ascertain if substantive
unconscionability can be found in the agreement.150 In coming to this decision, the
majority sets forth a finding of procedural unconscionability based on two
considerations: first, Gentry was not fully and adequately informed as to
arbitration; and second, that an employee in Gentry’s position would not feel free
to opt out.151
Justice Moreno carefully re-states that the presence of procedural
unconscionability, which the majority has found, does not necessarily invalidate
the arbitration agreement.152 Instead, it is an indicator to courts that the agreement
should undergo judicial scrutiny to ascertain if any substantive unconscionability
exists.153 The majority dictates that on remand the Court of Appeal should instruct
the trial court to look at the entire arbitration agreement and not simply the class
arbitration waiver.154 Lastly, if on remand, both procedural and substantive
162-63. In Gentry the court manages to turn the thirty day opt-out provision into an example of
procedural unconscionability. Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 470. In rejecting the Court of Appeal’s
determination that the opt-out provision exempted the agreement from procedural unconscionability,
the court’s reasoning is sparse and inadequate to make such a bold claim. See id. Justice Moreno
simply states that “Gentry’s failure to opt out of the arbitration agreement did not represent an authentic
informed choice.” Id.
149
Id. The majority, in relying on the precedent established in Armendariz, has too strictly adhered
to the dogmatic principles set forth in that decision. The Armendariz court simply noted that there are
two elements present in a finding of unconscionability and that they are often found in contracts of
adhesion. See generally Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 113-15. The employment setting is often one in
which contracts of adhesion are utilized; but, the failure to find procedural unconscionability
necessarily means that the contract may not be set aside based on unconscionability. See Neal v. State
Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961); and A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135
Cal. App. 3d 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
150
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 476. The instructions on remand to indulge in an analysis of substantive
unconscionability appears to be a leading instruction from Justice Moreno. The Court of Appeal had
determined that there was no procedural unconscionability and now the California Supreme Court has
determined there is procedural unconscionability. Compare Gentry, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 950; and
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 470.
151
Id. at 470-72. It is interesting that the majority finds procedural unconscionability in this
instance, especially given the distinctions drawn between Gentry and Discover Bank 2 by the court. In
Discover Bank 2, the procedural unconscionability was found to be the bill-stuffing of the arbitration
agreement and the deceitful manner in which cardholders were allowed to opt-out. See Discover Bank
2, 36 Cal. 4th at 153-54. In Gentry, Justice Moreno goes to some length discussing the provisions
within the ‘Associate Issue Resolution Handbook’ and the language of the ‘Dispute Resolution Rules
and Procedures’ packet as being confusing and unconscionable. Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 470-72.
152
Id.
153
Id. While Justice Moreno is careful not to group all class arbitration waivers as being
unconscionable, he is less careful in his instruction to lower courts regarding the presence of
unconscionability. The Court of Appeal underwent a thorough analysis of the arbitration agreement and
the class arbitration waiver. See generally Gentry, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 948-51. What the message the
California Supreme Court sends in this decision is that even a thorough analysis searching for
procedural unconscionability may not be enough, so lower courts should always indulge the substantive
unconscionability analysis as well.
154
Id. at 472-73. It is not clear from the lower court’s decision whether they in fact limited
themselves to the class arbitration waiver or whether they view it in the context of the entire arbitration
agreement. It would seem that a failure to find procedural unconscionability in the class arbitration
waiver, as the only challenged provision by Gentry, was what led the lower court to declare an absence
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unconscionability are found, then the trial court must decide whether the terms
should be severed or if the entire agreement should be invalidated.155
B. Dissenting Opinion – Baxter, J.
Justice Baxter, on behalf of Justices Chin and Corrigan, dissents in this
decision based primarily on the belief that deference should be given to private
arbitration agreements.156 The dissent contends that the majority’s decision is a
continuance of the precedent set forth in Discover Bank 2 whereby this court has
wrested more control over private arbitration agreements.157 It is argued by the
dissent that the FAA and CAA both serve to protect the freedom of individuals to
enter into arbitration agreements which will not be subject to interference from the
judicial forum.158
The dissent does not set forth a belief that all arbitration agreements should
be enforced; rather, absent the most exceptional circumstances, the courts should
allow the arbitration to proceed “as the parties themselves have agreed.”159 Quite
plainly, the simple fact that the arbitration agreement was a voluntary program
convinces the dissent that the court should not interfere in this instance.160 The
dissent cites a number of factors indicating the validity of the agreement including:
the straightforward nature of the documents, the inclusion of an opt-out provision,

of procedural unconscionability.
155
Id. at 473.
156
Id. at 473 (Baxter, J., dissenting). Justice Baxter, along with Justices Chin and Brown,
dissented from the majority in the Discover Bank 2 decision as well. See Discover Bank 2, 36 Cal. 4th
at 174, 185. Justice Corrigan did not take part in the Discover Bank 2 decision as she had not yet been
appointed to the bench as of June of 2005. Interestingly enough, Justice Corrigan replaced Justice
Brown on both the bench and in the dissent to this decision.
157
Id. (Baxter, J., dissenting). The Federal Arbitration Act was supposed to function as a national
policy in favor of arbitration. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). It
was meant “to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place them
upon the same footing as other contracts.” Id. The dissent argues that the majority is not abiding by
this central tenet of the Federal Arbitration Act.
158
Id. Justice Baxter sets forth a strong preference for the arbitral forum, characterizing the option
as “relatively cheap, simple and expeditious” when compared to the judicial forum. Id. The majority’s
decision, according to Baxter, is contrary to the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements”
found in the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. at 474.
159
Id. at 474 (Baxter, J., dissenting). “The FAA was designed ‘to overrule the judiciary’s
longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate . . . and to place such agreements ‘upon the same
footing as other contracts.’” Volt Info. Scis v. Leland Stanford Jr. U., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)
(quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219-20). The Gilmer court expressly
described the situation presented in Gentry where they acknowledged that “by agreeing to arbitrate, a
party ‘trades the procedures and opportunity for review in the courtroom for the simplicity, informality,
and expedition of arbitration.’” Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
160
Id. The dissent believes that there were sufficient mechanisms in place to ensure that the
employee was informed and that the program was indeed voluntary. For instance, the arbitration
agreement was set forth in a written agreement, “which plaintiff Gentry received” and “were further
explained in a video presentation, which he attended.” Id. The packet of information also stated that
the employee “could consult with an attorney about his legal rights.” Id. Finally, the packet clearly
stated that he could opt out without penalty by mailing a form within thirty days. Id. The sum of all the
parts found within the arbitration agreement, coupled with the failure of Gentry to exercise his opt-out
option, warrants the court upholding the arbitration agreement according to the dissent.
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and Gentry’s acceptance by signing the form.161
The dissent strongly disagrees with the majority’s finding of procedural
unconscionability sufficient to warrant a remand to analyze whether there is also
substantive unconscionability.162 In fact, the dissent notes that the majority does
not actually reach a result in this case “because [it] cannot – by any analysis to be
found in the prior case law.”163 The dissent carefully sets forth a detailed
distinction between the court’s holding in Discover Bank 2 and the present case.
The reasoning in Discover Bank 2 was that class arbitration waivers may be invalid
when part of a mandatory contract involving small amounts of damages.164
Justice Baxter notes here that the claims at issue are not necessarily
miniscule damage amounts; additionally, Circuit City did not attempt to
unilaterally force the arbitration agreement on their employees.165 According to
the dissent, the majority’s willingness to follow the Discover Bank 2 reasoning in
this case effectively invalidates all class arbitration waivers.166 While the majority
explicitly stated that these waivers were not necessarily invalid, the dissent
contends “that is the practical effect of the majority’s holding.”167

161
Id. This view would be keeping in line with the intent evidenced in the Federal Arbitration Act.
The Volt Info. Sciences court held that the FAA does not require arbitration; rather “it simply requires
courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with
their terms.” Volt Info. Sciences, 489 U.S. at 478.
162
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 475 (Baxter, J., dissenting). In a rather scathing rebuke of the majority’s
position in this decision, Justice Baxter notes that the basis for the majority’s holding cannot be found
in either case law or on public policy terms. Id. In order to find that this arbitration agreement was
unwaivable, the court must first establish that the “class remedy is essential” to the protection of that
statutory right. See Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 100-13. Without such a finding, which the majority has
not made, it is inappropriate to place the class arbitration waiver within the unwaivable statutory right
category.
163
Id. More emphatically than the failure to ground the decision in case law, the dissent also takes
the majority to task for failure to base their reasoning on public policy grounds. Asserting that
unconscionability as a contract defense is a public policy argument, the dissent then dismisses the
majority’s attempt to guise their reasoning under this umbrella. Id. See also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
(for the premise that arbitration agreements are enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.”). Id.
164
Id. The Discover Bank 2 court held that a waiver “found in a consumer contract of adhesion in
. . . disputes . . . predictably involve small amounts of damages . . . becomes in practice the exemption
of the party from responsibility for its own fraud” and is unconscionable under California law.
Discover Bank 2, 36 Cal. 4th at 162-63. see also Jonathan Rizzardi, Recent Development: Discover
Bank v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1093, 1095-96. Rizzardi
assesses the factors that the Discover Bank 2 court relied on in their analysis; specifically, the idea that
the impracticality of individual suits over small amounts of damages would allow the credit card
company to reap unjust profits. Id.
165
Id. at 475-76 (Baxter, J., dissenting). As noted in the majority opinion, the average wage and
hour claim in California over the five year period from 2000-2005 was between $5,000 and $7,000. Id.
at 458. This is a substantial difference from the Discover Bank 2 claims which would have been in the
amount of $29. Discover Bank 2, 36 Cal. 4th at 154.
166
Id. The extension of Discover Bank 2 to the present set of facts raises concern among the
dissenting Justices as the consumer contract application has now encompassed the employment
contract. See generally Myriam Gilles, Opting out of Liability: The Forthcoming Near Total Demise of
the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005) (discussing the impact that the court’s
disregard for class arbitration waivers may have on class litigation in the future); see also Linda J.
Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, Volunteering to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses:
The Average Consumer’s Experience, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004.
167
Id. The California Courts, pre-Gentry, seem to lean “heavily (if not overwhelmingly) on the
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Finally, on a public policy level, the dissent disagrees with the majority’s
interpretation of the California legislature’s intent surrounding arbitration
agreements.168 It is argued that the failure of the Legislature to provide that these
rights are statutorily unwaivable is no accident; instead, “the Legislature knows
how to provide for a right to class action relief that cannot be waived.”169 The
dissent again suggests that the majority is undermining the goals of legislative
actions including the FAA and CAA.170 The mere fact that the majority is finding
reasons not to enforce arbitration agreements evinces hostility towards arbitration
in contravention of the language of the FAA and CAA.171
Lastly, in response to the majority’s finding of procedural unconscionability,
the dissent contrarily takes the stance that there is no procedural unconscionability
and therefore the agreement should be enforced.172 Unlike mandatory contracts,
the arbitration agreement at issue was a voluntary program from which Gentry
could have opted out entirely.173 The dissent notes that the Court of Appeal, in
finding no procedural unconscionability, was in accord with two previous
decisions handed down by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal.174 Finally, the
side of state control, and in favor of traditional litigation” in lieu of enforcing class arbitration waivers.
Strickland & Newman, supra note 10, at 25. The holding in Gentry seems to reinforce the premise set
forth by Strickland and Newman that the courts would rather see disputes settled in the judicial forum
as opposed to the arbitral forum.
168
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 477, n.3 (Baxter, J., dissenting). Among the various statutes which seem
to favor the use of class action promulgated by the legislature include California Code of Civil
Procedure section 382 and California Labor Code section 923. Section 382 reads “when the question is
one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.”
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (Deering 2008). Section 923 states that “governmental authority has
permitted and encouraged employers to organize . . . [t]herefore it is necessary that the individual
workman have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his
own choosing.” CAL. LABOR CODE § 923 (Deering 2008).
169
Id. There are a number of statutes pointed to by the dissent which show the legislature’s ability
to set forth a “right to class action relief that cannot be waived.” Id. One such statute, as the court dealt
with in Discover Bank 2, was the Consumers Legal Remedies Act. See CAL. CIV. CODE. §§ 1751,
1752, 1781 (Deering 2008). Section 1751 explicitly states that “[a]ny waiver by a consumer of the
provisions of this title is contrary to public policy and shall be unenforceable and void.” Id. The
unwaivable provision, in part, stated that “[n]othing in this title shall limit any other statutory or any
common law rights of the Attorney General or any other person to bring class actions.” Id. Thusly, the
dissent argues that the legislature does know how to express their intent when they wish to do so; since
they have not under the applicable Labor Code in this case should mean the court should enforce the
class arbitration waiver.
170
Id. at 479 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
171
Id. The tone and findings of the majority’s opinion are contrary to the Congressional intent in
passing the Federal Arbitration Act whereby they sought “to reverse this ‘hostility to arbitration’.”
Glover, supra note 10, at 1739.
172
Id. at 480 (Baxter, J., dissenting). As the Court of Appeal below had found, the presence of the
thirty day opt-out provision meant that this class arbitration waiver was procedurally conscionable. See
Gentry, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 950. The lower court found that Gentry’s claim that the agreement was
procedurally unconscionable “despite the opt-out provision” was “without merit.” Id. Justice Baxter,
for the dissent, likewise believes that the ability to opt-out “without penalty, simply by mailing back a
form” was not procedurally unconscionable. GentryGentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 480 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
173
Id. By definition, a contract of adhesion must be one of a “take it or leave it nature” and the
ability to freely opt-out seems to imply that the Circuit City employment contract is not one of
adhesion. See generally Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 1064, 1071 (2003).
174
Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 480 (Baxter, J., dissenting). The interesting thing to note about the two
previous decisions in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal is that in each instance the employment
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dissent believes that the majority has erred in its interpretation of the class
arbitration waiver (as in Discover Bank 2) and further moved California “away
from the mainstream on this the issue.”175
V.

POST-GENTRY LANDSCAPE AND ANALYSIS

A. Administrative Impact on California’s Judiciary
In the wake of Gentry, California employers and employees will be forced to
assess whether or not their existing agreements are adequate to ensure that each
party gets what they had originally bargained for. Following the Gentry decision,
yet another step in the direction against enforcement of class arbitration waivers,
employers will want to ensure that they are able to enforce the employment
agreements that have already been signed.176 An inability to enforce class action
waivers will subject more employers to litigation, specifically class action
litigation.177
The cumbersome effect of Gentry may prove to be an increasingly crowded
state and federal judicial system within California. If the existing class arbitration
waivers are invalid and the California Supreme Court is going to subject arbitration
agreements to a greater degree of scrutiny, it would seem logical that the courts
will bear the weight of not just increased litigation but also increased diversity in
opinion.178 While there is a strong federal and state policy in favor of arbitral
forums, it stands to reason that with decreased confidence in the judiciary’s
willingness to uphold such agreements, both employers and employees will bypass
arbitration agreement was between Circuit City and their employees. Additionally, in each prior suit
brought through the Federal Court the court applied California state law in their analysis of the
arbitration agreements. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2002); and Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002).
175
Id. at 479 (Baxter, J., dissenting). Again, it is worth remembering what was noted by Strickland
and Newman following the Discovery Bank 2 decision. “The majority of jurisdictions that have ruled
on this issue allow enforcement of class action waiver provisions pursuant to ordinary freedom-ofcontract principles.” Strickland & Newman, supra note 10, at 25..
176
See generally Douglas A. Wickham & Ryan P. Eskin, Gentry v. Superior Court: California
Supreme Court Sets a High Bar for Enforcing Class Arbitration Waiver Clauses, ASAP (September
2007). Wickham and Eskin set forth, from an employer counsel’s point of view, the potential impact to
be felt by the Gentry decision. While the authors express guarded optimism over the fact the Gentry
court did not invalidate all class arbitration waivers, they do note that the decision casts doubt as to
whether class action waiver clauses will be enforced in a variety of employment settings. Id. at 3.
177
See id. at 4. The authors make a strong point that the ambiguity in the Gentry court’s holding
will lead to more litigation at the trial court level to ascertain whether or not a given class arbitration
waiver is valid or not. Id. Moreover, both the Federal and California Civil Procedure rules provide
courts with guidance as to class certification; however, the holding in Gentry has created greater
ambiguity in guiding the trial courts. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23; CAL.CIV. PROC. CODE § 382
(2004).
178
See generally John Rizzardi, Recent Development: Discover Bank v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1093, 1097-98 (2006) (stating that in the wake of Discover
Bank 2 there was a “’very significant impact on other courts’ presented with class arbitration waiver
issues”). The author notes that with the increased uncertainty as to the efficacy of class arbitration
waivers employers and employees are going to seek clarity and reassurance from the courts; thereby,
the amount of litigation in this area will likely increase as a result of its displacement from the arbitral
forum. Id.
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arbitration and steer towards the judicial forum.179
In addition to a greater number of employers and employees pursuing
litigation, the possibility also exists that the courts will see a greater number of
wage and hour cases being brought as class actions. If post-Gentry, the courts are
unwilling to enforce a class arbitration waiver, it seems plausible that the
aggrieved employee will avail themselves of the class action option to ensure the
suit is economically worthwhile.180 One trend in class action litigation is the
concept of avoiding a “negative value” claim; California declaring that class
arbitration waivers are effectively invalid opens the door to more class actions,
which typically do not succumb to “negative value.”181
As Gentry is interpreted and new agreements are negotiated between
employers and employees, it will be interesting to note the mechanisms employers
attempt to use to ensure that employees may only bring actions individually.
Employees, and their advocates, may find themselves emboldened to pursue class
actions where once they would have sought an individual resolution to their
claim.182 The overall impact of such a trend would be to not only clutter the courts
in California, but also to slow the resolution and recovery process for employers
and employees.183 In a field where many of the claims, albeit not all, will be of a
modest damage amount, the slowed recovery of any damages will hurt both
employers and employees in the process.184

179
See Wickham & Eskin, supra note 174.. “While upholding the validity of such clauses, the
court created a new standard that may create formidable obstacles to enforcement as applied to overtime
class action claims.” Id. One of the premises set forth by the authors is that the judicial forum will be
the only avenue to find clarity in a class arbitration waiver. The inability to enforce the waiver along a
bright line will spur employees to pursue the judicial forum and bypass their obligation to arbitrate their
class employment disputes. Id. at 3-4.
180
See generally Glover, supra note 10. A negative value claim is one in which the potential
litigant is unwilling to bring a claim because the cost to pursue the claim exceeds the possible recovery
if vindicated. Id. at 1737. If, under Gentry, the courts are willing to invalidate class arbitration waivers
the employee will be more inclined to join as a class to bring their claims to avoid a negative value
claim. However, where there are circumstances which a court, post-Gentry, will uphold the class
arbitration waiver, then this seems to invite class litigation by aggrieved employees to ensure again that
the claim is a positive value claim. It is the ambiguity in the Gentry and Discover Bank 2 holdings
which are creating such confusion as to which forum and type of claim an employee(s) should bring.
See generally Strickland & Newman, supra note 10.
181
As the majority noted, the average claim in Discover Bank 2 was to recover a $29 fee incurred;
on the other hand, in the average wage adjudication the recovery was $6,038. See Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at
458. While the difference between the consumer and employment is substantial, the reality is that even
a $6,038 claim is a negative value claim in today’s litigation dollars. See generally Glover, supra note
10, at 1737.
182
See Rizzardi, supra note 10, at 1097. The inability to count on class arbitration waivers will
have “an enormous effect in California and will make it impossible for companies to use class
arbitration bars as a get out of jail free card.” Id. A possible tactic which more businesses may employ
is to insert choice of law clauses so as to avoid the appearance in California courts where these clauses
are not certain to be enforced. Id. at 1098.
183
See generally Wickham & Eskin, supra note 174. It may very well be that the slowed course of
recovery is due to the invitation by the Gentry court for “trial courts to speculate as to whether a class
arbitration” waiver is valid or not. Id. at 4.
184
The majority opinion in Gentry notes that the employee may be intimidated by the thought of
bringing a claim against their employer as an individual; therefore the court wants to protect the right of
employees to join as a class to avoid possible retaliation. See Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 459-60. If the fear
of retaliation is one that the Gentry court wishes to dispel, then perhaps there should also be a cognizant
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B. Parsing of Additional Statutory Rights
A second potential impact from the Gentry decision will be in the way that
the courts, and possibly the legislature, carve up statutory rights, which will be
classified as either waivable or not. As the Gentry decision makes clear, and in
line with the Discover Bank 2 holding, the court is willing to view certain statutory
rights as being unwaivable.185 The real issue here is that the court has determined
that statutory rights may be deemed unwaivable either through a legislative textual
commitment or through judicial interpretation.186
The Gentry case was initially a grievance over the failure of Circuit City to
pay Gentry adequate overtime wages under the California Labor Code.187
Gentry’s argument was that he had been misclassified as exempt when hired and
therefore deprived of his statutory right to overtime.188 The issue post-Gentry
becomes whether the courts will extend their protective net beyond the current
holding (covering overtime wages) and begin to draw in other rights under the
Labor Code, or any other code for that matter.189 As the dissent makes clear, and

recognition of the inability of employees in a class litigation to recover quickly, thereby providing a
distinct disincentive for employees to bring their claims as a class.
185
See Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 456. “In short, the statutory right to receive overtime pay embodied
in section 1194 is unwaivable.” Id. (citing Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv., Inc., 24 Cal.
4th 83. This is where the majority most clearly deviates from their own precedent and that of the
United States Supreme Court. The Armendariz holding did not say that unwaivable statutory rights
were beyond the scope of arbitration. See generally Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th 83. Instead, Armendariz
set forth an analysis of the arbitral forum to ensure that unwaivable statutory rights would be adequately
adjudicated in that setting. Id. at 103. Likewise, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the
United States Supreme Court held that statutory claims may be “the subject of an arbitration agreement,
enforceable pursuant to the FAA.” Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. The Gilmer court set forth an important
holding in arbitration case law: “by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum.” Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chyrsler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985).
186
The majority here has again broadly read the statute as written and disregarded the precedents
before them. The statute itself says that “notwithstanding any agreement . . . the employee is entitled to
recover in a civil action.” Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 455. The statute itself does not explicitly state that it is
unwaivable, nor does the legislative history; instead, the majority takes an expansive view of the
language and infers intent on the part of the California Legislature to protect this statutory right from
being waived. Id.. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that “the party should be held
[to their bargain to arbitrate] unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver….”
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
187
The relevant sections of the California Labor Code address an employee’s statutory rights to
recover for violations of minimum wage and overtime laws. See generally CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 510,
1194.
188
Gentry’s claim, while brought under the California Labor Code provisions, is analogous to the
Fair Labor Standards Act which sets forth a federal policy in favor of a minimum wage provision. See
generally 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2008). In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.,, Inc. the United States
Supreme Court explicitly found that provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, while unwaivable
statutory rights, were subject to a valid arbitration agreement under the Federal Arbitration Act. See
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
189
See Gentry, 42 Cal.4th at 477. The dissent forcefully argues that the majority has overreached
and “elevate[d] a mere judicial affinity for class actions . . . above the policy expressed by both
Congress and our own Legislature that voluntary individual agreements to arbitrate . . . should be
enforced according to their terms.” Id. It would seem in the wake of Discover Bank 2 and Gentry, the
California Supreme Court is displaying a strong judicial preference in favor of litigation over
arbitration; moreover, the majority in each case chose to invoke the unwaivable nature of the statutory
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is evidenced by the language of the statutes, the FAA and the CAA state that this
right may be arbitrated if both parties are in agreement and certain minimum
requirements are met.190
What impact could an increased scope of unwaivable statutory rights have on
California? First, the employers may be more likely to classify employees as
“exempt” from hour and wage statutes to avoid the potential for a class action from
aggrieved employees regarding overtime pay.191 Second, more employees may
wish to be classified as “non-exempt” to ensure that they maintain their right to
bring a class claim for violation of their statutory rights to overtime wages.192 The
increased pressure on both employers and employees to classify job openings to
ensure that respective rights are protected will only add to the costs of doing
business in California.193
Lastly, if the legislature views the Gentry court’s interpretation of the
California Labor Code as incorrect, there exists a real possibility that the California
Legislature will begin to carve out statutory rights that did not previously exist.194
The legislature has evinced their intent to make certain rights unwaivable while
others are not afforded the same protection; however, as the court continues to
redefine legislative intent, it will spur the legislature to be more explicit in each

right as the basis for their holding. See, e.g., Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 456; Discover Bank 2, 36 Cal. 4th at
163.
190
See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. The Gilmer court noted that there have been a number of
statutory rights for which the court has approved of the arbitral forum. For instance, the court has
validated arbitration agreements addressing the Sherman Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and the Securities Act of 1933. Id. The
Armendariz court also noted that the use of the arbitral forum is appropriate to resolve statutory right
disputes given certain safeguards to protect the statutory right of the aggrieved. Armendariz, 24 Cal.
4th at 103.
191
The applicable California Labor Codes are not applicable to employees classified as exempt
under the statutes. Therefore, had Gentry’s job description been in conformity with an exempt position,
Circuit City would not have been liable for the claims alleged by Gentry. Therefore, businesses may be
inclined to classify their employees as exempt in order to avoid the wage and overtime provisions of the
California Labor Code.
192
This point goes to the pragmatic nature of a negative value claim discussed in the Vanderbilt
Law Review Note by J. Maria Glover. The negative value claim is especially topical in the
employment wage and hour setting as the misclassification of an employee may lead to damages, but
nominal damages when totaled. See generally Glover, supra note 10. Without the assurance of a class
action, an individual employee may be less inclined to file a complaint over wage and hour violations.
Therefore, it may behoove an employee to seek out a non-exempt job in California as the Gentry
decision may protect them from individual arbitration and provide an avenue for recovery through class
litigation.
193
See generally MILKEN INSTITUTE, 2005 COST OF DOING BUSINESS INDEX 1 (2005),
http://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/cost_of_doing_business_2005.pdf. The state of California ranks 4th
for the highest cost of doing business, due in no small part to having the 5th highest wage cost index. Id.
194
While a legislative response from the California Legislature would surely be a reactionary piece
of legislation, as opposed to a proactive statute, it would set forth once and for all their actual intent.
The United States Supreme Court, in Gilmer, noted that the courts should look for an express textual
commitment from the legislature in ascertaining whether or not a statutory right is considered
unwaivable. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. Specifically, if the California Legislature wants to make their
intent known, courts will look to the text of the statute, the legislative history or an “inherent conflict
between arbitration and the [statute’s] underlying purposes.” Id. If the courts, as in Gentry, continue to
infer a legislative intent which is not expressly committed, then the legislature will be forced into action
to clear up the confusion perceived by the courts.
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statutory right they confer on citizens.195 Increased clarity in legislation is not
necessarily a negative, but it may invite a great deal of strife between employers
and employees as they attempt to influence the outcome and classification of
certain statutory rights under the Labor Code.196
C. Public Policy Impact on California Business
In light of the above arguments, it would seem that Gentry will have farreaching implications within the state of California, and potentially beyond its
borders. In denouncing class arbitration waivers, the California Supreme Court
has created yet another reason for employers to seek to move their operations out
of state.197 As noted by the dissent, the Gentry holding moves California
increasingly away from the mainstream on the issue of class arbitration waivers.198
As employers begin to reevaluate their agreements with employees, it may be
beneficial for a corporation to take their operations out of state to avoid the
possibility of class actions brought by employees.199

195
As in Barrentine, the court is capable of reading the statutory language correctly where the
legislature explicitly states their intent. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 expressly stated that “an
aggrieved employee [may] bring his statutory wage and hour claim ‘in any Federal or State court of
competent jurisdiction.’” Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 740. As such, the Barrentine court declared that the
Fair Labor Standards Act is of a nonwaivable nature and may not be “abridged by contract or otherwise
waived.” Id. Again, to draw an analogy between the Fair Labor Standards Act and the California Labor
Code, the Gentry court may very well be correct that the statutory rights at issue are unwaivable.
However, in order for the court to assess that this right is unwaivable, they must discern that from the
legislative language itself. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
196
This is a topic which is unaddressed in this Note, but certainly worthy of future inspection. As
the courts are inferring legislative intent, and the legislature is responsively legislating to clarify their
intent, the employers and employees will weigh in on that legislative process. The increase of proemployer or pro-employee influence into the legislative process will only spur greater debate as to the
waivable or unwaivable nature of various statutory rights under the Labor Code.
197
Among the various factors contributing to a business exodus from California are the
environmental regulations, costs of employing workers and the perceived anti-business sentiment
within the state’s government. See generally Jennifer Robison, Bill May Stir California Business
Exodus, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Sept. 7, 2006 at 1D; Stephen Vames, Businesses Ponder
Leaving California, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2003; Los Angeles County Economic Development
Corporation, Economic Vitality, Trade & Jobs, 2005 accessed at http://www.laedc.org/newsroom/
releases/2005/20051116-list.pdf (last accessed February 4, 2008). The sum total of these elements has
proven difficult for California to overcome in recent years when coupled with a national economic
downturn. One study cited in the Vames article cites 20% of the 400 California businesses contacted
had business plans which included leaving California. See Stephen Vames, Businesses Ponder Leaving
California, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2003.
198
In the wake of Discover Bank 2 the attorneys for Discover Bank noted that the refusal to uphold
class arbitration waivers further lead California away from the mainstream on this issue. See Julia B.
Strickland & Stephen J. Newman, Shock Waives, 29 L.A. LAW. 22, 25 (Mar. 2006). “The majority of
jurisdictions that have ruled on this issue allow enforcement of class action waiver provisions pursuant
to ordinary freedom-of-contract principles.” Id. Moreover, the “majority of courts faced with class
action waivers have upheld their validity against claims that they are unconscionable.” J. Maria Glover,
Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59
VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1751 (2006). Additionally, at the Federal Court level, the “Third, Fourth, Fifth
and Seventh Circuits all have enforced class action waivers.” Id. at 1751-52.
199
As the landscape in California grows blurrier, in-state corporations will be confronted with a
crucial decision as to whether they should expose themselves to possible class litigation by their
employees or seek a majority jurisdiction in which they can ensure that class arbitration waivers will be
upheld. Prestigious labor and employment firms, such as Littler Mendelson P.C., have issued releases
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Additionally, from a pragmatic standpoint, the California Supreme Court’s
aim in clarifying Discover Bank 2 should be to provide greater guidance and
clearer lines for the trial courts to adopt. However, the vague nature of the Gentry
decision provides no new guidance for trial courts to assess whether or not the
class arbitration waiver actually waives an unwaivable statutory right.200 Perhaps
clear examples of other unwaivable statutory rights, a bright line test, or some
other means could have aided the trial courts and avoided duplicative claims in
years to come.201 The failure to delineate why this particular statutory right is
unwaivable, and what criteria trial courts should use to make that same
determination, will lead to greater confusion and an eventual re-clarification by the
California Supreme Court.202
A significant portion of the majority’s decision focuses on the precedent set
in Armendariz regarding the invalid nature of an unconscionable arbitration
agreement.203 This dogmatic adherence to the Armendariz analysis has created
to their clients (and potential clients) advising of the potential risks they may face in light of the Gentry
holding. See generally Douglas A. Wickham & Ryan P. Eskin, Gentry v. Superior Court: California
Supreme Court Sets a High Bar for Enforcing Class Arbitration Waiver Clauses, ASAP (Sept. 2007),
available at http://www.littler.com/PressPublications/Documents/17256.pdf. Perhaps the most apt
description of the current state of affairs, regarding class arbitration waivers, is that “Gentry establishes
a very high bar for enforcing class action waiver clauses in the face of overtime claims, [but] the bar is
not completely insurmountable.” Id. at 3. Thus the current state of affairs is ambiguous if nothing else!
200
“The resolution of this issue will be left to trial courts and intermediate appellate courts for
development in future cases.” Id. at 4. The failure to draw a bright-line test, or distinguish between the
validity of one clause and the invalidity of the Circuit City arbitration clause, has presented a troubling
landscape for businesses to navigate. As with many issues for Corporate America, it will likely become
a purely economic decision. This is problematic for California, as noted in note 195, supra, the
business climate is already unwelcoming for newcomers to California.
201
Absent the presence of clear legislative intent the courts, in their role as interpreters of statute,
should provide clarity for the lower courts and business community in California. Instead, the Gentry
court has created a void in the dialogue where before there was assurance. The lack of express
legislative language in the California Labor Code meant that employers could rely on the validity of a
class arbitration waiver in their employment contracts. However, post-Gentry, employers are left with
the admonishment that “Gentry directs trial courts to evaluate the relative effectiveness of the class
action device in the specific case when deciding whether to enforce the class action waiver clause.” Id.
This failure to provide for reasonably anticipated conflicts in employment contracts may very well be
the lasting legacy of Gentry – creating more confusion than clarity.
202
One article has already attempted, in summary fashion, to encapsulate what the authors believe
to be the factors trial courts will consider when weighing the class arbitration waiver. See id. at 2. The
four factors Wickham and Eskin glean from the decision are: “1. the size of the potential individual
recovery and whether it is ‘modest’ or not; 2. the potential for retaliation against members of the class;
3. whether members of the class may not be informed of their rights; and 4. other ‘real world obstacles’
to the vindication of the putative class members’ right to overtime pay through individual, and not class,
arbitration.” Id. This note takes the position that these four factors are not dispositive of the Gentry
holding; therefore, it seems to the author that Wickham and Eskin place too great an emphasis on these
four factors.
203
While it is true that the Armendariz court held that an unconscionable arbitration agreement was
void based on contract principles, it is an insufficient parallel to the Gentry case. Armendariz set forth
an analysis by which the court should assess the adequacy of the arbitral forum; in addition,
Armendariz’s focus was to ensure that the arbitral forum was adequate so as to adjudicate statutory
rights of the aggrieved. See generally Armendariz, 36 Cal. 4th at 102, 113-15. The Gentry court’s
reading of Armendariz indicates an expansive role for Armendariz in future California case law. In
particular, Armendariz only sought to ensure that the arbitral forum allowed the employee to “vindicate
his or her statutory rights.” Id. at 90. This should be read as an endorsement of the arbitral forum;
instead, the Gentry court has taken Armendariz’s holding and used it to usurp the authority of the
arbitral forum to adjudicate wage and hour statutory right cases.
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two real problems in the wake of Gentry. First, the majority’s strict reading of the
clause “after a dispute arises” means that all class arbitration waivers have been de
facto eliminated in California.204 If pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory
rights are invalid, as is the case presented in Gentry, then the practical effect will
be that post-dispute arbitration agreements of statutory rights will be impractical to
enter into by either party.205 Second, the new standard of judicial scrutiny applied
to arbitration agreements will likely result in a greater number of agreements
deemed unconscionable under Armendariz.206
While the majority was too strict in its adherence to Armendariz, it was quite
expansive in the way they interpreted the legislative intent behind the California
Labor Code provision at issue.207 The dissent makes a compelling argument as to
the true legislative intent; it is noted that there are other statutes which explicitly
state that the right is not waivable.208 It would seem that the majority has
attempted to expand the realm of unwaivable statutory rights without regard to the
legislature’s ability to declare their intent if they so choose.209 This disregard of

204
The majority attempts to draw a bright-line between a pre and post dispute arbitration
agreement in the statutory rights context. See Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 467. However, by drawing this
bright-line, the majority has carved out the entire pie in attempting to slice it.
205
See generally J. Maria Glover, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735 (2006).
206
This hypothesis remains to be seen. The true impact that Gentry will have in the coming years
will be found at the trial and appellate court levels throughout California. However, in the meantime,
employers and their counsel will certainly be evaluating their employment agreements to arbitrate
disputes, particularly as they relate to wage and hour issues. Many attorneys will likely advise their
clients to take a ‘wait and see’ approach to this issue as the wheat is separated from the chaff.
Confusingly, “the Gentry court did not ‘foreclose the possibility that there may be circumstances under
which individual arbitrations may satisfactorily address the overtime claims of a class of similarly
aggrieved employees, or that an employer may devise a system of individual arbitration that does not
disadvantage employees in vindicating their rights under section 1194.’” Douglas A. Wickham & Ryan
P. Eskin, Gentry v. Superior Court: California Supreme Court Sets a High Bar for Enforcing Class
Arbitration Waiver Clauses, ASAP (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.littler.com/PressPublications/
Documents/17256.pdf.
207
It is worth noting the interesting conflict inherent in Justice Moreno’s opinion. On the one
hand, Justice Moreno narrowly construes the precedent set forth in Armendariz; however, in the next
stroke of his pen, Justice Moreno expansively interprets the limited statutory language of section 1194.
See generally Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 455, 467. The lengths and limitations Justice Moreno goes to, in
writing for the majority, suggests that perhaps the dissent may have been on-point with their primary
critique of the majority’s reasoning – the majority’s decision does not sound in either case law or statute
because there is no such basis for the holding. See Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 475 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
208
As in Discover Bank 2, Justice Baxter dissents from the majority as they attempt to constrict
and limit the application of the Federal or California Arbitration Acts. Justice Baxter notes that both the
United States Congress and the California Legislature have enacted legislation with explicit language as
to the unwaivable right they are conferring. See Gentry, 42 Cal. 4th at 477 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has reiterated the same point on a number of occasions;
yet, in this instance and in Discover Bank 2, the majority turns a blind eye to the textual silence
evidenced by the California Legislature in California Labor Code section 1194. See, e.g. Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728
(1981).
209
The expansion of the seemingly unambiguous language of section 1194 in and of itself is not a
typical example of so-called judicial activism. If, however this is a trend beginning with Discover Bank
2 and going forward, the California Supreme Court may continue to expansively grant citizens greater
statutory protection by deeming rights unwaivable. The danger here is usurping the individuals
fundamental right to contract as evinced by the Federal Arbitration Act section 2. See generally 9
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the legislature’s role in drafting laws serves to further cloud the already murky
waters of statutory interpretation for employers and employees when drafting
agreements.210 As stated above, this will only serve as yet another negative for
corporations considering whether to conduct their affairs within California or
elsewhere.211
Lastly, on a legal philosophy level, how do employers and employees feel
confident in their existing, or to be formed, agreements in California? One of the
hallmarks of corporate law is to provide predictability so that both parties can feel
secure in their decisions.212 Gentry creates a significant amount of doubt and
concern for both parties going forward. It will not be until the next employmentrelated class arbitration waiver case makes its way to the California Supreme Court
that any further clarity can be found.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Gentry, the California Supreme Court has again, in line with Discover
Bank 2, moved California further from the mainstream when it comes to class
arbitration waivers. The Court of Appeal had found that the class arbitration
waiver was valid within the arbitration agreement which was deemed
conscionable. In reversing the lower court, the majority has created a more
confusing body of case law and invited more litigation surrounding class
arbitration waivers. The conclusion that in some instances a class arbitration
waiver could be invalid provides little guidance for lower courts, employers or
employees in California.
Gentry represents an expansion of the precedent set in Discover Bank 2 and
a trend in California to raise up the judicial forum as superior to the arbitral one.
In apparent contravention of the national and state policy in favor of arbitration,
the majority has carved out yet another exception whereby litigation should prevail

U.S.C. § 2 (2008).
210
While prior to Gentry employers could feel secure that the statutory language would be adhered
to, akin to Barrentine, Gilmer, and Mitsubishi Motors Corp., in the post-Gentry landscape there will be
more uncertainty. See generally Barrentine, 450 U.S. 728; Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20; Mitsubishi Motors
Corp., 473 U.S. 614. The California Legislature has not expressed a desire to ensure that an
employee’s statutory rights to minimum wage and overtime are unwaivable. However, the
interpretation by the California Supreme Court in Gentry leads employers to infer that there may be
many other employee-related rights which may be characterized as unwaivable.
211
From a common sense perspective, it would behoove corporations to domicile themselves in a
state which favorably interprets arbitration clauses within employment contracts (such as Oregon,
Arizona or Nevada). Following Gentry, it seems evident that California is moving from the majority
and joining the minority of jurisdictions which will not uphold similar class arbitration waivers in an
employment setting. See generally Julia B. Strickland & Stephen J. Newman, Shock Waives, 29 L.A.
LAW. 22 (Mar. 2006). A brief look at the states which do uphold class arbitration waivers, from a
geographic standpoint, could lead employers to operate in any of the states bordering California. In
fact, according to Strickland and Newman’s review, California is the only state west of the Mississippi
River which does not recognize class arbitration waivers. See id.
212
Professor Thomas G. Bost, Corporations Law Lecture, given at Pepperdine University School
of Law (Fall 2007). In addition to providing predictably in corporate law, according to Professor Bost,
the goals of a friendly business atmosphere are laws which are workable, predictable and friendly to
corporations. Gentry has presented yet another stumbling block for California business law in each of
the three aforementioned goals.
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over arbitration. Without further clarification, or legislative action, Gentry may
prove to be yet another demerit in the eyes of Corporate America as it measures
the corporate climate within California. California’s future is set to include an
over-taxed judiciary laden with employment arbitration agreements, increased
litigation over statutory rights, and an increasingly expensive and uncertain
business climate.

